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Presentation 
 
 
The second volume of the series Re-thinking Europe offers an extended and revised 
version of a collection of papers selected from those presented at the third edition of the 
workshop Re-Thinking Europe held on 19th December 2014 at the Free University of 
Brussels (VUB) and organised by the Centre for Ethics and Humanism in collaboration 
with the Centre for Critical Philosophy of Ghent University. 
As the reader will see, the present volume examines a diversity of topics 
(cosmopolitanism, fraternity, the burqa ban debate, political theology, human rights and 
democracy) from very different perspectives, methodological strategies and scientific 
backgrounds. Nevertheless, all papers share the same ultimate horizon of meaning: 
Europe as an on-going challenge of permanent reflection on the limits, constraints and 
possibilities of critical thinking. 
We would like to thank the authors for their contributions and the directors of both 
research centres, Karl Verstrynge (EtHu) and Gertrudis Van de Vijver (CCPh) for their 
collaboration a support in the organisation of the third workshop of Re-Thinking Europe. 
 
Brussels, December 18th 2015  
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Leibniz and European cosmopolitanism 
 Lukas K. Sosoe 
Université du Luxembourg 
lukas.sosoe@uni.lu 
 
 
 
It might be surprising to many to present Leibniz as a political thinker, and more 
precisely, as one of the forerunners of a European cosmopolitan idea, that of European 
federalism. Leibniz is known as a great metaphysician, as well philosopher and diplomat, 
but not as a great political thinker of European and world scale. One need only choose the 
series of books dedicated to the history of Western political ideas to realize Leibniz’s 
absence. Not merely historians of modern European philosophy, but even political 
philosophers ignore Leibniz’s contribution to political philosophy, as a pioneer of the idea 
of the European Union. Leibniz’s name does not figure in German academic anthologies: 
absent, for example, from the fourth edition of the Klassiker des politischen Denkens 
(1979)1 from Plato to Max Weber, celebrated by the review Neue politische Literatur in the 
70s as “ein gelungenes Schulwerk”, characterized by the book review the Zeit as a work 
expounding the “Gesamtbild einer Geschichte abendländicher Staatstheorie” and edited by 
political scientists like Hans Meier, Heinz Rausch and Horst Denzer. The chapter “The 
Federalists” of the same book mentions only the American founding fathers: Hamilton, 
Jefferson and other Federalists. No Europeans besides Immanuel Kant and the authors of 
the great idea of the Respublica Christiana of the Medieval and early Modern philosophy, 
are mentioned.  
There may be many reasons for this. One of them owes to the huge volume of 
Leibniz’s philosophical work and the scattered character of most of his philosophical 
thinking, in addition to his status as a diplomat and politician, which overshadows his 
political philosophical writings. The separation of Leibniz’s political thought from his 
metaphysical theory stands as another reason. And finally, an important number of 
Leibniz’s political writings could be easily found in journals on the history of international 
relations or theology than in journals on philosophy. 
The purpose of this contribution is to sketch Leibniz’s place in the history of political 
ideas on European federalism. We will not be able to give an exhaustive account of his 
political ideas in general, but we believe it to be possible to highlight his contribution to 
 
1 Klassiker des politischen Denkens, Vol I. Von Plato bis Hobbes ; vol II : von Locke bis Weber. Munich, 
1976. 
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the idea of the European Union underlying the basic concepts of his political thought 
(Riley 1972, 1- 44), Goyard-Fabre, 1994, 105-120)2 by showing both the central role 
played by Leibniz in European political and federal thought as an important figure on the 
long list of the greatest pioneers of European federalism and the direct impact of his 
political ideas on great thinkers from Wolff to Kant and beyond. 
In a word Leibniz proves as important as Crucé, Dubois, Guillaume Postel, 
Podebrady, Abbé de Saint-Pierre and even Wolff in his concern for a European federalism. 
With his program of a universal republic, Leibniz establishes himself as an important 
benchmark on the way to Wolff's universal republic and Kant’s Perpetual Peace.  
In what follows, we will sketch in a first step Leibniz’s idea of a universal republic, 
which is a political ideal, also called by him, Optima Respublica or Respublica Christiana or 
Civitas Dei. Secondly, special attention will be paid to the theological and metaphysical 
foundations of Leibniz’s cosmopolitanism, to his Civitas Dei based on natural right 
embracing the whole world and to the place of the Christian republic within this 
cosmopolitan structure, i.e. a republic in accordance with the teachings of Jesus Christ. In 
this context, Leibniz’s Mars Christianissimus, which contains a very severe criticism of 
France’s imperialism in Europe and a defense of the German princes based on the 
Westphalian Treaty, plays a significant role. The last part will be dedicated to Leibniz’s 
position on European federalism and to his debate with Abbé de Saint-Pierre. This debate 
has the advantage to reveal clearly Leibniz’s idea of European federalism. It will become 
clear that these three parts are all based on Leibniz’s metaphysical and theological 
premises. This explains why many commentators of Leibniz’s political ideas contend that 
his whole metaphysics was at the service of his unified global international political order 
and, specifically, at the service of his Civitas Dei. (Cheneval 2002, p. 53)3 
 
2 For a more comprehensive presentation of the basic notions of Leibniz's political thought, see 
Patrick Riley: Leibniz. Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972, the 
introduction pp. 1-44; see also Goyard Fabre, La Construction de la paix ou le travail de Sisyphe, Vrin, 
Paris, 1994, Part I, p. 105-120.  
3 “Leibniz stellte die universalische Metaphysik in den Dienst der Politik und entwurf eine 
Weltrechtsphilosophie (…) Lebniz’ Rechtsmetaphysik spielte in deiser Hinsicht bei der Entwicklung 
des modernen politischen Universalismus eine Gründerrole” Francis Cheneval, Philosophie in 
weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung. Über die Entstehung und die philosophischen Grundlagen des 
supranationalen und kosmopolitischen Denkens der Moderne, Schwabe Verlag, Basel, 2002, p.53. 
Siehe auch Simone Goyard-Fabre, “L’européanisme des pionniers” in : Regards croisés sur la 
constitution avortée de l’UE, in: Gary Overvold, Philippe Poirier et Lukas Sosoe (Ed.) Paris, 2011, p. 
31- 48. 
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I 
Leibniz’s political thought can be summarized thusly: harmony and reconciliation 
and conciliation. Without the search for harmony and conciliation, Leibniz’s philosophy 
would amount to that which Bertrand Russell takes it to be: a sheer opportunistic 
discourse at the service of changing European political powers. (Rusell 1964, p. 202)4 
Through harmony and conciliation, Leibniz succeeds in laying down the metaphysical and 
theological foundation of the unity of this thought made of “apparent conflicting ideas” 
taking from each kind of thought that which proves soundest and synthesizing it with the 
seemingly incommensurable truths of other systems, in this way fusing “Platonism, 
Cartesianism, Christian voluntarism, Hobbesian mechanism”, etc., into a system of thought. 
(Riley, 1972, p. 2)5 That is why the search for the “harmonie universelle” or universal 
harmony is the key concept which lends Leibniz’s philosophy a unified shape and can be 
seen as the core of his thought. (Holz 1996, p. 5)6 One understands why Leibniz sought to 
develop a universal jurisprudence. By “universal jurisprudence”, we mean that Leibniz 
intended the establishment of a world republic, a hierarchical system of law common to 
God as the perfect being and man. “God and man exist in a society of a universal republic of 
spirits, the noblest part of the universe […] in which universal right is the same for God 
and for men.” (Riley 1972, idem)7 The cosmological and cosmopolitan character of 
Leibniz's political philosophy appears from the start. It stands as a metaphysical theory 
based on God and the order of creation.  
Leibniz welcomes every idea necessary to sustain this political philosophical 
program. One of the best illustrations is his work: Civitas Dei, the City of God where God is 
considered the supreme power, the monarch. Since God is the monarch of the universal 
city, his word is the natural law and theology a part of jurisprudence. The Christian Church 
hence possesses a legal and political significance. Whereas believers or Christians are the 
citizens of God’s Republic (Republica Dei), pagans are declared rebels who must be fought 
(ubi infideles quasi rebelles sunt). (Leibniz 1666, par 42, p.190)8 In this political theory of 
universal monarchy, morality can only be understood as a legal concept and the relation 
between man and God as a political relation hierarchically ordained. That is why for 
Leibniz “it is best to derive human justice, as from a spring, from the divine in order to 
make it complete. Surely the idea of just, no less that the idea of the true and the good, 
 
4 Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, Allen, London, 1964, p. 202. 
5 Patrick Riley, Leibniz. Political Writings, Op.cit., p. 2. 
6 Hans Heinz Holz, Sitzungsberichte der Leibniz-Sozietät, 13, 1996, S. 5. 
7 Patrick Riley, Op. cit., idem. 
8 De Arte Combinatoria, § 42, 190. 
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relates to God. (...) and the rules which are common certainly enter in to the sciences and 
ought to be considered in universal jurisprudence.” (Leibniz, 1706)9 
Leibniz's metaphysics is entirely written in political concepts. It appears from the 
above cited text that there is no difference between God’s and human justice. The 
difference proves one of degree. It can be considered on three levels: 1) On the level of the 
relation between Man and God, 2) on the level of the natural law of the entire human race 
and 3) on the level of the State. 
The State, according to Leibniz, represents the lowest stage of the universal legal 
public order. It is subordinated to the World and the human race. Leibniz speaks of “omnia 
societati universali sub Rectore Deo” instead of the World, and this reveals the 
cosmological and cosmopolitan character of his conception of Law. That means that the 
whole world is God’s city and the legal rules of this city his Laws. 
Secondly, the metaphysically grounded structure of Law has a goal, namely the 
common good (publice utile), because it is subordinated to the direction of God’s will 
insofar as God as Monarch of the whole universe wants for Man the best possible good. 
Thirdly, when Leibniz refers the State to the universal structure of Law, he does not 
heed the fate and the multiplicity of concrete States. For him, individuals do not matter in 
this context. The fact of their existence is neglected or underestimated when compared to 
the world legal divine order. The project of the Civitas Dei or of the universal cosmopolitan 
republic prevails over the individual States in which God is the Sovereign and legislator. 
Leibniz is convinced “que le monde est une espèce de cité aussi bien ordonné(e) que 
possible, dont le Seigneur a en main la sagesse et la puissance souveraine”(Leibniz 1679, 
p. 523) 10 for the common good of the spirits. By spirits, Leibniz means all reasonable 
beings, all monads or simple substances living in the City where God reigns as Monarch. 
The Civitas Dei is a society created, conserved and governed by God. It proves a 
cosmopolitan State based on reason. As Leibniz states it in the Discours de métaphysique: 
“Il ne faut pas seulement considérer Dieu comme le principe et la cause de toutes les 
substances et de tous les Estres, mais encore comme chef de toutes les personnes ou 
substances intelligentes, et comme Monarque absolu de la plus parfaite cité ou République, 
telle qu’elle est, celle de l’univers composée de tous les esprits ensemble, Dieu lui-même 
étant aussi bien le plus accompli de tous les Esprits.”11 (Leibniz 1686 par 35, 88) 
 
9 Opinions on the Principles of Pufendorf in Riley, Patrick, Op.cit. 64- 75. 
10 Dialogue entre un habile politique et un ecclésiastique d’une piété inconnue (1679-1682), p. 523. 
11 Discours de Métaphysique, (§35, 88) Leibniz speak also of « République générale des Esprits dont 
le chef est Dieu » (Essais de Théodicée, § 120). 
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In these, one finds the main lines of Leibniz’s political philosophy which can then 
easily be summarized by underlining the Civitas Dei's main characteristics. The Civitas Dei 
is metaphysical-theologically conceived as the normative ideal of the perfect State and 
Monarch, the latter God himself. All human beings and societies have to submit themselves 
to this Monarch's power, which is not to be identified with command but with justice. 
Every rational being necessarily belongs as citizen to the City of God. We have also 
mentioned the City's cosmopolitan nature. The main question is how and where Leibniz’s 
European federal order fits in this overarching world society. Where is the place of a 
federal Europe in the world political structure and which kind of role does Leibniz assign 
Europe to play therein? And, finally, as the whole political philosophy is based on God, 
what is the function of religion and, specifically, the Christian religion in world politics and 
in relation to non-Christians in the world? 
II 
Leibniz’s political philosophy cannot be thoroughly presented without mentioning 
his writings on international relations, especially the relations between European states. 
For that, we need to know more of Leibniz's conception of natural right. 
In writing on international affairs, Leibniz gives a concise definition of natural right 
and the relation between natural right, Civitas Dei and international Law. 
In a paper on Abbé de Saint-Pierre's project of perpetual peace in Europe, Leibniz 
writes:  
 “When I was quite young, I became acquainted with a book entitled Le Nouveau Cynée whose 
unknown author advised sovereigns to govern their states in peace, and to let disputes be 
judged by an established tribunal, but I no longer know how to find this book…” (Leibniz 
1715, Riley 1972, p.178-183)12 
This indicates his early interests for European and world political problems given 
that the book Le nouveau Cynée speaks of peace and unity in Europe, which Leibniz's Codex 
Juris Gentium (Leibniz 1693; Riley, 1972, p.165-176)13 will further develop.  
Contrary to almost all philosophers in his lifetime, Leibniz shows in the definition of 
political philosophy's main categories that there proves no separation or distinction 
between Law, religion and theology. “Tout est lié”, he contends, not only in the City of God 
 
12 Observations on the Abbé Saint-Pierre’s for Perpetual peace (1715). 
13 All the references to the Codex Juris gentium are abreviated. 
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but also in international relations, the ultimate ends of which remain peace and happiness 
for the realization of which Europe possesses a special mission. 
One of the objectives of the Codex Juris Gentium is, as stated in the Preface, to 
understand the law of nations. Nevertheless, Leibniz takes the opportunity to clarify again 
a few basic notions from his political philosophy like justice and law, which, Leibniz 
laments, even after having been treated by so many illustrious authors, have not been 
made sufficiently clear.14 
“Right is a kind of moral possibility and obligation a moral necessity. By moral, I mean that 
which is equivalent to “natural” for a good man [...] A good man is one who loves everybody, 
in so far as reason permits [...] Justice, then is, [...] will be most conveniently defined […] as 
the charity of the wise man, that is charity which follows the dictates of wisdom” (CJG, 170-
171). 
Needless to say how strange and peculiar these definitions are compared to Hobbes' 
or Pufendorf's and even to Grotius'. Leibniz’s definition has little to do with the natural 
right tradition. The reader will already have noticed it with the main features of the Civitas 
Dei. Most of Leibniz's writings make no difference between law, a legal duty and a moral 
duty. Here begin the difficulties in understanding Leibniz's concepts of practical 
philosophy. Far from Locke's distinguishing two great maxims in moral philosophy, 
namely justice and charity, Leibniz's conflation of the two comes out in the following 
definition: “Charity is universal benevolence and benevolence the habit of loving or willing 
the good. Love signifies rejoicing in the happiness of another [...] into one’s own.” (Idem) At 
first glance, the reader is drawn into utilitarian considerations. Then, as D’Holbach says: 
“L’homme vertueux est celui dont les actions tendent constamment au bien-être de ses 
semblables. La vertu n’est que l’art de se rendre heureux soi-même de la félicité des 
autres.”(D’Holbach 1966, Chap. XVI, p. 405) 15 Yet Leibniz’s conception of happiness ends 
at a theological idea of God’s perfection, an idea which no utilitarian would defend. Thus 
Leibniz says that divine love exceeds all other loves because God can be loved with greater 
result since nothing is happier than God and nothing more beautiful and more worthy can 
be conceived.” (CJG, 171) Leibniz contends that, as God possesses the supreme power and 
supreme wisdom, his happiness becomes and even creates our own. At last, he concludes 
that wisdom is the science of happiness.  
The clearness of this chain of definitions proves far from self-evident. This is not, 
however, the place to analyze in detail the relationships between wisdom, happiness, 
benevolence, perfection, utility and charity. All these concepts lead to Leibniz’s conception 
of law and justice; the latter is the Love of God from which natural right flows. 
 
14 Our quotations are taken from Patrick Riley’s translation of the Preface of the Codex Juris 
Gentium, in Leibniz. Political writings, Op. cit., id. and abbreviated as CJG and quoted in the text. 
15 D’Holbach, Le système de la nature, Hildesheim, New York, 1966, Chap. XVI, p. 405. 
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Furthermore, simple right is born out of the principle of conservation of peace. This stands 
as the principle of avoidance of misery, and higher right tends toward happiness. But to 
prove the truth of this conceptual edifice, Leibniz contends, we must assume the 
immortality of the soul and the existence of God as ruler of the universe, a perfect 
monarch who imposes all natural laws, rewards just actions and punishes wrong ones. 
“The divine providence and power cause all right to become fact and assure that no one is 
injured except by himself, that no good action goes unrewarded, and no sin unpunished.” 
(CJG, 174) Indeed, this is the teaching of Jesus Christ.  
Leibniz’s definition of natural law follows from theological grounds. Accordingly, it 
leads us to a universal political order based on divine providence. Although it also 
contains the description and analysis of the political situation in Europe, such as the 
alliances and treaties between princes, the Codex Juris gentium, at least in its preface, 
proposes little more than the description and explanation of divine monarchy. On this 
ground, justice is called universal and includes all other virtues, even duties towards 
oneself, such as “not to abuse our own body or our own property”. These kinds of abuses, 
which stand beyond the power of human laws, “are still prohibited by natural law, that is 
the eternal law of divine monarchy, since we owe ourselves and everything we have to 
God.” (CJG, 174) It appears that without God’s supreme power directing the universe, 
punishing wrongs and rewarding good actions, there can be no moral and political order. 
Leibniz establishes this order on a theologically founded natural right theory which is of 
interest to the state and of a much greater interest to the universe. (CJG, idem) 
All that is needed for the development of cosmopolitism has already been given. And 
Leibniz’s theologically, even christologically founded cosmopolitism serves as a theoretical 
realm in which European federalism finds its legitimate place. Before we come back to this 
topic, a few more stories need to be told on Leibniz’s international relations or divine 
monarchy. 
III 
Leibniz takes it for granted that the Christian religion reveals God’s will and should 
likewise be the fount of the world social and political order, as much of the individual 
states as of European federalism. The tight link between the City of God, the theory of 
natural right, and revelation gives the impression that Leibniz’s political thought finds its 
ground in a kind of theology of revelation. This would mean that the ultimate justification 
of the Divine city rests on faith in the teachings of Christ and the Christian religion. At this 
point, there becomes necessary further clarification which we cannot undertake here. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that Leibniz confers, without any justification, a 
precedence to Christianity over other world religions and justifies its extension through 
war against those religions and cultures in the world as we will see later. For present 
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purposes, it suffices to bring forward a few passages to show the kind of dogmatic 
certainty with which Leibniz affirms the so-called truths of the Christian religion and their 
superiority over other religions: 
 “Les anciens philosophes ont fort peu connu ces importantes vérités : Jésus Christ seul les a 
divinement exprimées et d’une manière si claire et si familière que les esprits les plus 
grossiers les ont conçues [...] il nous a donné à connaître le royaume des cieux ou cette 
parfaite république des esprits qui mérite le titre de cité de Dieu et dont il nous a découvert 
les admirables lois.”(Leibnitz 1686, Ed. Fichant 2004)16  
Jesus Christ’s teaching not only overrides that of other religions. For Leibniz, there is 
no doubt that Jesus stands as the founder of the purest and most enlightened religion:  
“les sages d’autres nations en ont peut-être autant quelquefois, mais ils n’ont pas eu le 
bonheur de se faire suivre assez et de faire passer le dogme en loi [...] jusqu’à ce que Jésus 
Christ leva le voile, et sans avoir la force en main, enseigna avec toute la force d’un 
législateur que les âmes immortelles passent dans une autre vie, où elles doivent recevoir le 
salaire de leurs actions [...] Jésus Christ acheva de faire passer la religion naturelle en loi, et 
de lui donner l’autorité d’un dogme public.”(Leibniz 1710, Ed. J. Brunschwig 1969)17 
This finds its basis in what here seems a revelation as Leibniz observed that the 
theory of natural right is “jus naturae et gentium traditum secundum disciplinam 
chriatianorum id ex Chriti documentis” (CJG, p.8)18 and that “the learned have rightly held 
[...] that the law of nature and of the nations should follow the teachings of Christianity [...] 
the divine things of the wise, according to the teaching of Christ.” (CJG, p. 174)  
Besides the concept of natural right so defined, Leibniz also recognizes what he calls 
voluntary right “derived from custom or made by superior”; in the state, civil law receives 
its force from the one who holds the supreme power. Outside the state, the supreme 
power is the voluntary law of nations originating from the tacit consent of peoples. In 
addition to this international law of nations, Leibniz contends that “Christians have 
another common tie, the divine positive law contained in the sacred Scriptures [...] the 
sacred canons accepted in the whole Church and, later, in the West, the pontifical 
legislation to which kings and peoples submit themselves.” (CJG, id.) This Christian 
universalism overshadows the rational structure of other peoples' natural right and allows 
Leibniz to restrict his cosmopolitism to European Christian nations, to the “common 
republic of Christian nations”, the heads of which remain the Pope in sacred matters and 
the emperor in temporal matters. Thus, Leibniz's cosmopolitism ends at a Europeanism in 
which two different theories are at play: one is rational and general and valid for all; the 
 
16 Leibniz, Discours de métaphysique, édition établie, présentées et annotée par Michel Fichant, 
Gallimard, Folio, 2004, p. 217. 
17 Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée, Préface, p. 26-27. 
18 Codex Juris gentium, Préface p. 8. 
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second based on positive legal structure derived from Christian revelation, gentium 
christianarum respublica, in other words, a Christian republic which is, at the same time, 
for Leibniz, the justification of the European Christian federal order with the right to wage 
wars against non-Christian peoples, Turks, Muslims and non-European peoples. The 
question proves how this Europeanism can be situated, “harmonized” or “conciliated” 
within Leibniz’s universal political theory, i.e. in Leibniz's cosmopolitanism. 
A partial and tentative answer to this question may be found in the Codex Juris 
gentium where Leibniz develops his conception of war and peace. It may help 1) in 
understanding why and how Leibniz's universal republic can go hand in hand with his 
strong Europeanism or European federalism and 2) in capturing its fundamental intuition. 
Leibniz deems it not unreasonable to believe, like Hobbes, that war between states 
and peoples is and will be perpetual. Wars are destructive and do not honour the 
belligerents, most of all a war waged between civilized nations. In this sense, Louis XIV's 
expansionist politics in Europe should be severely condemned. Leibniz himself did so in 
his Mars Christianissimus. Leibniz is not, however, a pacifist for maintaining such. Indeed, 
it is preferable that the state be ready for war if needed or that they make tactical alliances 
against an assault coming from an enemy. Thus, it remains prudent and realistic to ready 
oneself, for, as Leibniz writes:  
 “Quand les Français prêchent la paix, c’est à peu près le sermon que le renard allant en 
pèlerinage à Saint Jacques et publiant une amnistie générale entre les animaux, faisait à une 
troupe de poules qu’il rencontra sur son chemin. Ils ont sans doute fort bonne grâce de 
parler de paix perpétuelle, eux qui ne connaissent aucune autre que celle d’un esclavage 
générale à la turque.”(Leibniz, Werke 1864-1884)19  
Nevertheless, Leibniz insists on the validity of a minimal justice demanding that one 
not injure anyone, of a superior justice corresponding to charity, and of a universal justice 
useful for all mankind. Yet the validity of the rules of justice does not stand in opposition 
to the idea that, if one wants peace, one should be ready for war. “Tout home de bien, says 
Leibniz, demeure d’accord qu’on ne doit jamais faire guerre que lorsqu’il est nécessaire” 
(1864-1884, 110) Therefore, states which follow peace should be armed, unless they are 
united by common interest. In that case they must make alliances with each other. Against 
France’s expansion the just war is that which the just man should undertake to restore 
peace. (1625, Truyol y Serra 1984, p. 68)20 
 
19 Die Werke von Leibniz. Historisch-politische und staatswissenschaftliche Schriften, Hanover (1864-
1884), vol V, p. 254. 
20 Leibniz, Raison touchant à la guerre ou l’accomodement avec la France (1625) See also A. Truyol y 
Serra, Die Lehre vom grerechten Krieg bie Grotius und bei Leibniz und ihre Bedeutung für die 
Gegenwart, Studia Leibniziana, XVI/ 1(1984), 60-72. 
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IV 
The political situation in Europe after the Thirty Years War was one of total 
desolation, misery, hunger and political anarchy. In this situation, which kind of peace 
there was for reconstruction? With a common interest in both, European states needed 
more than ever to become closer and work together. As a Christian philosopher, jurist and 
diplomat, Leibniz felt the necessity to take concrete measures for the reconstruction of 
Europe: 1) reconstruction of Christianity's lost unity, 2) reconstruction by pacification of 
political relations between European countries by exporting the violence outside Europe 
and 3) construction of the project of a European union. 
1.) Leibniz never accepted the Church's division following the Reformation. As one 
can notice in his correspondence with Bossuet, he strives for the unity of Catholic and 
Protestants by downplaying insofar as possible the dogmatic aspects of the church's 
division and by putting his effort into the unity of Christianity and the integrity of the Holy 
Roman Empire's constitutive nations with the Pope and the Emperor as the spiritual and 
secular heads respectively. But numerous tensions and rivalries plagued the empire. 
Accordingly, the solution lay in exporting tensions and wars outside Europe; its states, for 
the sake of peace, should then conquer other parts of the world in order, among other 
ends, to spread the Christian religion and, at the same time, to satisfy their thirst for power 
and expansion.  
2.) Indeed, Leibniz makes concrete proposals about the way political structures in a 
17th century Christian Europe devastated by wars could reorganize themselves through 
the imposition of the pax christiana on the world. Starting with the acknowledgement of 
an imbalance between forces at the European level, Leibniz made every effort possible to 
analyze methodically the situation and, to that end, made suggestions, where his 
diplomatic talents constantly shone through. Through metaphysically and religiously 
based argument, he legitimates France's conquest of Egypt, and this not without defending 
the Habsburgs against France. In a highly satirical and somewhat amusing writing, Mars 
Christianissimus (Most Christian War God, 1683), he suggests that France wage war 
against the Turks instead of conquering Christian nations like Holland and other European 
nations. In this same writing, Leibniz voices the idea of an alliance between German 
Protestant princes against the power of Catholic France under Louis XIV. And beyond 
Louis XIV, he pleads for a new European political balance. For Leibniz, the political 
unbalance in Europe owes to the “House of France”, to which the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648) and the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) have granted too many advantages. These 
treaties, intended to protect stability in Europe or the “political balance of Europe”, have 
instead led to a state of disharmony that fails to respect other states’ sovereignty. 
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According to Leibniz, the “policy of balance” proves in fact a policy that is “unbalanced”21. 
Before this balance, it is important to rethink the overall issue of interstate relationships, 
to replace, on one hand, strategies of division by those of unity and, on the other, 
strategies dictated by passion by those of reason.  
Leibniz's solution consists in “exporting” the tensions and rivalries between 
European houses to other parts of the world. The justification of this imperialistic solution 
lies in the superiority of the European Christian religion and culture. First of all, Leibniz 
recommends to Louis XIV to conquer Egypt; by doing so, he will strengthen his kingdom 
and weaken the Turk instead of waging war against Holland, a Christian country: 
“Je veux parler, Sire, de la conquête de l’Egypte. De toutes les contrées du globe, l’Egypte est 
la mieux située pour acquérir l’empire du monde et des mers : la population dont elle est 
susceptible, et son incroyable fertilité, l’appellent à cette élévation. Jadis, mère des sciences 
et sanctuaire des prodiges de la nature, aujourd’hui elle est le repaire de la perfidie 
mahométane, pourquoi faut-il que les chrétiens aient perdu cette terre sanctifiée, lien de 
l’Asie et de l’Afrique, digue interposée entre la mer Rouge et la Méditerranée, grenier de 
l’Orient, entrepôt des trésors de l’Europe et de l’Inde?”(Leibniz, 1672 Ed. de Joffmanns 
1840)22 
Leibniz finds two justifications for Egypt’s conquest. The first consists in hindering 
France’s expansion wars in Europe. The second reason lies in spreading the pax 
christinana all over the world.(Kaplan 1995 p. 91.95)23 The conquest of Egypt is a “bellum 
sacrum”, a holy war against the pagans for the utility of mankind. Economically and 
politically, Europe's greatest threat, the Turks, will be discarded. By giving up its 
expansion in favor of the Christian nations and by waging war against the infidels, France 
and the Habsburgs will share mastery of the world and will be able to contribute both to 
the Christian religion's expansion and to peace and prosperity in Europe. 
3.) In a third step, Leibniz designs a project for political Union for the prosperity of 
Europe, although he himself favoured universal monarchy. At the time, he still admired 
Louis XIV and would have entrusted him with the general direction of European state 
affairs: at the least, the charge of arbitrating disputes and litigations. When confronted, 
however, with Louis XIV's expansionist politics, wholly at odds with a politics of 
concordat, he gave up his first draft of the project of the Union and concentrated his effort 
on German unification. For Leibniz, Germany “is the kernel of Europe” (CJG, § 87). Leibniz 
 
21 History will confirm that assertion : after its victories, France saw the creation of coalitions 
against her ; these eventually isolated the former and shifted the situation (Treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle, Nijmegen and Ryswick). 
22 Mémoire de Leibniz à Louis XIV, sur la conquête de l’Egypte, Edit. By M. De Hoffmanns, Edouard 
Garnot, Paris 1840, p. 3-4. We underline. 
23 See J. Zenz Kaplan: Das Naturrecht und die Idee des ewigen Friedens, Brockmeyer 1995, 
Dortmunder Historische Studien, p. 91-95. 
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further wrote in a strong nationalist mood that there is only Germany which is “personne 
civile” (CJG, §88) capable of giving Europe its unity. It therefore proves vital that it become 
a highly centralized State. It must become a true federal State legally harmonizing or 
conciliating the diversity of German states in political unity: the Empire. 
In his capacity as diplomat and also philosopher, Leibniz suggests to each power a 
solution to satisfy its thirst for expansion in the world. To Leibniz, that division amounts to 
what those powers must do to ensure peace in Europe: the carving up of the world outside 
Europe. Thus. England and Denmark have to occupy North America; Spain, South America; 
Holland, East Indies; and France, with divine providence, is designated as the Christian 
warrior in the Middle East. To that end, it finds itself bound to attack Africa and Egypt. 
Likewise, West and East India must be dominated. Human beings must wage war against 
wolves and wild animals prior to domestication, to which barbarians and infidels are 
likened.24 
It is only at this price that Europe can realize its dream of peace. At the same time, 
Leibniz develops a cultural plan consisting in the creation of learned societies to help to 
complete his imperialistic program. For peace and development and all the interests of 
mankind, learned Societies are indispensable to achieving the ideal of Civitas Dei. In this 
sense, Leibniz fully shares the scientific optimism of Bacon’s Novum Organum. 
As Goyard-Fabre expresses it, “to rebuild Europe’s shredded political unity, is a task 
that, in Leibniz’s philosophy, does not come under the classic issue of 'The One and the 
Multiple'; it must be considered metaphysically, that is to say according to the vertical 
reference to the almighty divine’s eminent perfection of which universal harmony and 
jurisprudence are the expression”. (Goyard-Fabre 2011, p. 41)25 This implies the 
transformation of the circumstances of justice, imposed by the House of France, to use 
Hume’s expression, into circumstances of peace, based on law – law offering possibilities 
of regulation outside of the state of non-right, the state of nature. But law means 
understanding, and understanding means that we are only one step away from 
establishing its mechanisms: a union of all European states. Then what stands as the basis 
of the union recommended by Leibniz? 
In his work Securitas publica, impressive as it remains relevant even today, Leibniz 
suggests an association of sovereigns (§32), presided by a rotative Emperor, its objective 
being a “permanent alliance” (concilium perpetuum) with the function of the arbitration in 
order to avoid an absolutist government. That is why a federation of sovereign national 
states would be the suitable political strategy. The federation of sovereign states will 
 
24 Leibniz, Securitas publica, 1670-71, I, 167. 
25 Simone Goyard-Fabre, L ‘européanisme des pionniers, in : Gary Overvold, Philippe, Poirier, Lukas 
K. Sosoe, Op. cit. p. 41. 
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assure the political unity necessary; every state needs to defend its interests against other 
political powers but also to respect the freedom and plurality of the States under the 
imperial administration. This kind of federation of national sovereign states is far from 
what Abbé de Saint-Pierre is proposing which is totally different from the perpetual 
council aiming at “the common interest of States” (§24)26 in the same Empire. Thus 
introducing a theme which he discussed unsuccessfully with Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Leibniz 
insists on the creation of peace in the union, on the safeguard of each people's and 
culture's difference. The advocated union must, at the same time, guarantee the diversity 
of its components. With this, he anticipates by two to three hundred years the “aborted” 
project of a European constitution wherein the question of unity in diversity is raised 
(Oliver Duhamel, 2003, p.158) 27 - which, unfortunately, is no longer to be found in the 
Lisbon Treaty. Far from being an obstacle, that diversity is well accepted and perceived 
and remains, to Leibniz, the stepping stone towards the opening up of other sociopolitical 
and cultural horizons: towards the cultural wealth of each state, each nation having its 
own particular genius. 
V 
One cannot entirely discuss Leibniz’s foundation of European federalism without 
taking into account the correspondence between l’Abbé de Saint- Pierre and Leibniz about 
the Mémoire pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe (1712), which helps him to clarify 
some points of his European federal dream. Leibniz cannot be indifferent to that project. 
Vanishing though his dream is to resuscitate the Holy Roman Empire with the Pope and 
the Emperor as heads of the Empire of universal Christendom, he answered Abbé de Saint-
Pierre. His answer reveals how realistic and practical Leibniz could be in political matters 
but also his position against the federation of individual sovereign States based on a 
contractual model. 
L’Abbé de Saint-Pierre published from 1712-1717 his Projet de paix perpétuelle 
wherein he puts forth an idea of European Union founded on the contractual tradition. 
This intends to replace the imperial order by a federation of sovereign states with a 
central government. This project of a Union bases itself on a dual political power, the 
major goal of which is to secure peace in Europe, as indicated by the title. He sent it to 
Leibniz not only to seek his opinion but to use his influence to help the former convince 
European princes. 
 
26 Cf. Entretiens de Philarète et d'Eugène: that text, beyond its circumstance has an ideological 
dimension. 
27 Duhamel, Olivier, Pour l’Europe. Le texte integral de la constitution expliqué et commenté, Seuil, 
Paris, 2003. 
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In his first reaction to Saint-Pierre, Leibniz expresses an apparent scepticism full of 
civility. But, as we know, his theory lies in imperial Christian order. “Men lack the will to 
deliver themselves from an infinity of evils”, he wrote to Abbé de Saint-Pierre: “If five or 
six persons wanted to, they could end the great schism in the West and put the church in 
good order” (Leibniz, 1715 Ed. Riley, 1972)28 To put an end to wars, “it would be 
necessary that Henri IV, together with some great princes favour your project. The evil is 
that it is difficult to suggest it to great princes.” (Leibniz 1715, idem)29 
But this finds itself only the apparent reason. Indeed, the main reason proves that, in 
his Codex Juris gentium, Leibniz carried out a general inventory and evaluation of 
international relations and all agreements made under the history of the Empire. This 
history is, for Leibniz, the princes' concrete rights, especially those of the Holy Roman 
Empire's princes. (Cheneval 2002, p. 112-113)30 It amounts to more than a merely 
normative discourse like the Saint-Pierre’s project, which remains, for Leibniz, wholly cut 
off from concrete legal life and historical reality, from the psychological and strategic 
considerations of European princes. 
In a small text, “Observation on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s project for perpetual 
peace” written in 1715, Leibniz insists on the fact that Saint-Pierre’s project has no 
originality. Leibniz shows clearly his position by questioning the project's originality in 
reference to Crucé’s Cyneas.31 Leibniz maintains his position against Saint-Pierre’s idea of 
confederation. For him, Saint-Pierre’s project of perpetual peace is somehow naïve. The 
European political situation does not allow to see any dream of perpetual peace. The 
project is a utopia the political price of which would be very high. It will lead to the lost of 
freedom, happiness and justice of the citizens and each confederate member state will 
follow its own economic and politic interests and lose sight of the common ones which can 
 
28 Letter to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre » (1715) in: Leibniz. Political Writings, Patrick Riley (Ed.), Op. 
cit., 176. 
29 Op. cit., idem. 
30 See Francis Cheneval, Op.cit., p. 112-113. 
31 « Everyone knows, Leibniz adds, that Cyneas was the confidante of King Pyrrhus, who advised 
him to rest, (content with what he has) at once, because that would also have been his goal, as he 
confesses to him, if he had conquered Sicily, Calabria, Rome an Carthage. » Emeric Crucé’s work 
particularly deserves mention. He is the author of a work entitled The New Cyneas, Cyneas (1623) 
being the name of a collection of publications about the project for peace in Europe and around the 
world. The New Cyneas is full of stories about the Romans, Albanians, Turks and British, about 
priests, the rich, and thieves, about philosophers, kings and their advisers… It is a diplomatic 
program intended for monarchs and princes. The preface unveils this program: 
“It is necessary before everything else to uproot the most common vice and the one which is 
the source of all others, namely, inhumanity”.  
To do so, Crucé underlines, that what matters first and foremost is to enlighten minds and, 
secondly, because human society is “one body, of which all the members are in sympathy” with one 
another, to bring them closer: only then will they reach happiness – the French, Europeans, and 
lastly, all Christians. For this union, faith in intelligence and reason is necessary and sufficient: not 
only will it effectively stop the act of resorting to violence, it will smoother the instinct of war itself 
in humanity 
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be favored only by the Empire of the German principalities the union of which is 
indispensable for a new equilibrium in Europe. 
With his Realpolitik Leibniz thinks that Saint-Pierre’s project is against the very idea 
of international law and international politics. In his opinion a Saint-Pierre’s project of 
European federation transgresses the idea of international politics understood as a 
legitimate “struggle for power” to survive and safeguard one’s sovereignty. Unless the 
sovereignty of other States is guaranteed, the achievement of a confederation would not 
be only totally irrational, but also an impossibility in a state of total disequilibrium, 
devastation and desolation. In any case, it would not be the best action to be taken. 
For Leibniz, the European federal state has to avoid absolutism. It must contribute 
to the rise of a strong nation indispensable for political equilibrium in Europe. It must be 
powerful enough to oppose the two potential aggressors, from the East Louis XIV’s France 
and from the South the Muslim Ottoman Empire. For that a treaty is needed between 
different nations of the Empire if the search for equilibrium must become a reality, a real 
peace depending on that equilibrium if we don’t want to confuse the Pax Ludovica or the 
French peace with that which Europe really needs. 
Leibniz’s position is not only similar to a Hobbesian account of security in the 
natural condition of man but also to the contemporary security solution adopted during 
the cold war in Europe. The dictate of reason in Hobbes’s natural condition of man is “that 
every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope to obtaining it; and when he 
cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use all helps and advantages of war”. (Hobbes, 
Leviathan 1976, Chap. VIV, p.190)32 Leibniz is also for peace but not any price and at any 
condition. It seems to him that the most rational course of action in the situation in which 
the German states find themselves at that time, needs war to restore acceptable, that 
means fair conditions of peace. It is also the kind of action taken during the cold war : the 
balance of terror. Only a good balance of terror has produced a deterrence effect on the 
world power. Without the Union of the states of the Holy German Empire there can be no 
peace or the only peace possible would that of the House of France. So Saint-Pierre Project 
would suppress one side of the scale. And this against the idea of Harmony. That is why is 
necessary to restore, even at the price of war, the precondition of peace: political 
equilibrium of European political powers.  
Leibniz’s concept of peace is very different from that of Kant. Peace is a negative 
concept for Leibniz. It means the absence of war (pax absentia belli) and is contingent 
treaties (pactum pacis) among states or parties and achievable only through an 
international legal order (jus Gentium) which confers its legitimacy to the just war against 
 
32 Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. XIV, London, Penguin book, 1976, p. 190. 
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the infidels, non-European, especially Turks and perhaps France (Bellum justum) (Rodan, 
2007 p.124)33 
Should the federation be absolutely realized, the unity of the Empire should be 
conserved as a member of the confederation.  
“Since Saint-Pierre has given us two plans for Christian society, Leibniz argues, one in which 
the Emperor with the Empire make up one member and one in which the Empire is 
destroyed and in which the emperor would have a voice only as a hereditary sovereign (in 
Austria) and in which the elector would have each one vote, I must be for the former plan 
and Justice itself would prefer this plan, following the very principle of M. l’Abbé de Saint-
Pierre, that the Christian society must leave things in their present state.” (Leibniz 1715, Ed, 
Riley 1972, p. 181)34  
Should the federation be inevitable, the Empire must remain as it is. Otherwise, 
Leibniz goes quite far in the direction of Saint-Pierre’s Project, which he apparently took 
rather seriously as a diplomat and as a politician. As regards Saint-Pierre's proposal of a 
European tribunal, Leibniz observed that it possesses no guaranty. Perpetual peace 
between States requires a guaranty without which any agreement would prove mere 
words for powerful princes. He took up the European confederation's fourth article, which 
provides for administrative and even military sanctions against member States unwilling 
or unable to comply with the rules. This article in Saint-Pierre’s project reads:  
“By the fourth shall be specified the conditions under which any Confederate who may break 
this Treaty shall be put to the ban of Europe and proscribed as a public enemy: namely, if he 
shall have refused to execute the decisions of the Grand Alliance, if he shall have made 
preparations for war, if he shall have made a treaty hostile to the ends of the Federation, if he 
shall have taken up arms to resist it or to attack any one of the confederate.” (Rousseau, 
2013, p. 574) 35 
Instead of planning to declare war against the State inclined to violate the federal 
clauses, Leibniz makes the proposal to establish a European Federal Court in Rome over 
which the Pope should preside and play judge between Christian princes. He pleads for 
resuming the old ecclesiastic authority, as well as for excommunication “making Kings and 
Kingdoms tremble”. Similarly, he stands for a federal financial guaranty, for an European 
central Bank, because certain nations will be powerful enough not to respect the European 
tribunal. Thus, to reinforce Saint-Pierre’s proposal, he wrote: 
 
33 Concha Roldán, Pax perpetua y federacion europea. La Critica de Leibniz a Saint-Pierre, in : II” 
(FFI2010-15914), “Filosofía de la historia y valores en la Europa del siglo XXI” (FFI2008-
04279/FISO) y “Enlightenment and Global History” (ENGLOBE: Marie Curie Inicial Training 
Network: FP7-PEOPLE-2007-1-1-ITN). P. 124. 
34 Leibniz, Observations sur le projet de l’Abbé de saint Pierre, Op. cit. p. 181. 
35 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Projet de paix perpétuelle, Polysynodie de l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre, in 
Œuvres Complètes, Galimard, Pléiade, Paris, tome III, Paris, 2013, p. 575. 
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“It will be necessary that all these gentlemen contribute a caution bourgeoise or a deposit in 
the bank of tribunal, a King of France, for example, hundred millions écus and a King of Great 
Britain in proportion, so that the sentence of the tribunal could be executed on their money, 
in case they prove refractory.”(Leibniz 1712 Ed. Riley 183-184)36  
The interest of the guaranty would be returned to the princes; in cases of refraction, 
the princes would, however, lose them.  
Both contrary to Kant’s hyper-optimistic and somewhat metaphysical solution, 
wherein the reference to providence or nature replaces the guaranty of perpetual peace, 
and against Saint-Pierre’s proposal of judicial sanctions without the power of enforcement 
against powerful member states, Leibniz suggests a highly practical and pragmatic 
solution two years before his death. Leibniz’s suggestion is a politician’s diplomatic 
decision, a strategic decision. Leibniz neither waits for nature’s prowess to drive human 
beings willy-nilly to peace nor for a punitive expedition of tribunal doomed to failure in 
the face of powerful states. Leibniz chooses the path of efficiency: a European central bank, 
as the use of force or war remains uncertain in terms of time and resources. For Leibniz, a 
financially backed agreement comes to the best guaranty of peace. 
Although Leibniz sends this letter to Saint-Pierre to show his good will to review the 
project, he still believes it rather unoriginal and classifies it on a long list of similar 
proposals. For Leibniz, it stands as one more project among many others on peace in 
Europe; yet it proves nothing but a romance. “But since it is permitted to write romances,” 
he confesses in the same letter to Grimarest, “why should we find bad the fiction which 
would recall the age of gold for us.” 
VI 
A history of transcendental philosophy without Kant would be not imaginable. It is 
not exaggerated to say that the same holds for Leibniz concerning the philosophical 
foundation of the European Union. No account on the philosophical foundation of 
European federalism will be finished without mentioning Leibniz’s philosophical 
endeavor. At quite different periods of his life, Leibniz seeks solutions as to how Europe's 
unity could be achieved through a union or a federal system. From the metaphysically 
grounded ideal of Civitas Dei to the Letter to Grimarest about Saint-Pierre’s project two 
years before his death, Leibniz never ceases to insist on European unity in his writing. He 
finds in this unity the ferment for the development of the whole world and human 
 
36 Letter II to Grimarest: Passages concerning the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Project of Perpetual Peace 
(June 1712). This proposal will be sent to Abbé de Saint-Pierre on the 4th of April 1715 by Leibniz 
himself.  
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emancipation. Peace is needed for that. And, for Leibniz, it will come from Europe. Yet still 
Leibniz remains a cosmopolitan philosopher. His Eurocentric attitude has to be considered 
as a stage on the way to a world society even if, from a normative point of view, it remains 
unacceptable. It is not an end in itself but just as his argument for just war one of the 
means to a global political order, the last stage of which will be dominated by learned 
societies. In this sense, a more systematic contribution will certainly be necessary to 
account for the many, sometimes contradictory, aspects, of Leibniz’s immense legacy in 
political philosophy in general and especially for Europe, an Europe contributing to peace 
and harmony in the world.  
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Introduction 
1. An unusual title and an unlikely comparison 
The history of philosophy is undoubtedly full of authors and writings that one can 
study in order to deal with the problematic articulation between the Universalist 
discourses and the concept (or experience) of Otherness. Given this fullness of choices, 
this paper’s title might seem awkward since neither Hans Kelsen’s writings nor Claude 
Lefort’s works appear at first sight to deliver thoughts on these themes. 
Indeed, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) is one of the most significant European legal 
thinkers of the mid-twentieth century. Surely, one is familiar with the author’s major 
work, the Pure Theory of Law. In this emblematic book, and in more than four hundred 
writings, one finds the expression of the same idea: Kelsen’s lifetime work is in fact an 
effort to build a scientific knowledge of law. This perspective is based on a particular neo-
Kantian epistemology1 of human cognition: because men can only build a scientific 
knowledge with empirical facts as raw material, they cannot access an absolute concept of 
justice. Therefore, the scientific effort to know the essence of law is correlated with a 
strong rejection of Natural Law. According to Kelsen, the Natural Law doctrine is non-
scientific by definition since it pretends to detain an absolute concept of justice; in other 
words, it oversteps what the Pure Theory considers to be the limits of human cognition. 
This radical opposition to Natural Law theories in the name of science is a strong claim 
that one can find haunting the whole work of Kelsen.  
On the other hand, Claude Lefort (1924-2010) is a contemporary French political 
philosopher known for his conception of Democracy as an “empty place”, and for his 
 
We use as much as possible the English translations available. For this reason, we also indicate the 
original references used with the help of the following abbreviation: “OV”. The reader will find a 
complete list of the original texts and their translations at the end of the paper. 
 
1 On this particular topic, see: Merle, J.-Ch., “La conception du droit de Hermann Cohen et de Hans 
Kelsen”, Revue germanique internationale, 6, http://rgi.revues.org/1095 and Wilson, H., “Is Kelsen 
really a Kantian?”, in: Tur, R. & Twining, W., (eds.) Essays on Kelsen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986, pp. 37-64. 
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denunciation of totalitarianisms2. Lefort’s work focuses on these political forms because, 
according to him, they are not political regimes but a way used by people to live in the 
Modern Era3. From this perspective, the modern political world is considered and defined 
as something in movement, dynamic, and always changing – in short: modern societies are 
a new way of both doing and thinking the political. This claim makes sense if one 
considers Lefort’s view on the Modern Era itself: it is the point of history where men are 
experiencing a new world, a world where the ultimate markers of certainty have been 
dissolved4. This new Weltanschauung, this unique worldview leaves men with an 
alternative: either they choose to assume this unsettling radical indeterminacy, or they 
choose to annihilate it. The first choice is precisely what Democracy is: it is the choice to 
assume together that every decision taken will be questioned and that nothing can be 
settled once and for all. The second choice, on the contrary, is that of Totalitarianism. It is 
the refusal of the constant questioning implied by Modernity: in this framework, people 
refer to a symbolic pole that will be in charge of indicating what is good and what is not, 
what is just and what is unjust, etc. In other words, they try to annihilate the 
uninterrupted questioning correlated with their modern conditions, by hiding it behind a 
symbolic pole of power that seems to be stable. 
These short introductions to Hans Kelsen and Claude Lefort might force one to 
assume that a comparative reading of the two authors will be, not only out of focus 
regarding the theme illustrated earlier – the interrelation between Universalist discourses 
and the concept of Otherness – but also inconsistent. Furthermore, nothing seems to link 
them to one another considering they were not contemporaries and not even compatriots. 
 
 
 
2 See Flynn, B., The Philosophy of Claude Lefort, Interpreting the Political, Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2005, p. XXI: “Arguably Lefort is one of the few political 
philosophers, together with Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, and a small number of others, who 
have elaborated a plausible interpretation of the totalitarian phenomenon.” 
3 See Lefort, C., “Three notes on Leo Strauss” in Writing, the political test, (D. Ames ; Trans.), 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000, p.200 : “Let anyone who doubts that [the fact that 
Democracy cannot be reduced to its institutions] simply observe how difficult it is, for a people 
accustomed to live under a despotic regime, to regain the will to be free. A change of institutions 
does not suffice to achieve it.” (OV: Lefort, C., “Trois notes sur Leo Strauss”, in Ecrire, A l’épreuve du 
politique, Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1992, p.296). In other words, according to Lefort, Democracy is not 
merely defined by democratic institutions. 
4 See Lefort, C., “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism” in The Political Forms of Modern 
Society. Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism. (A. Sheridan; Trans.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 1986, pp. 292-319, pp.303-304 : “Democracy inaugurates the experience of an 
ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be said to be sovereign, of course, but 
whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will remain latent.” (OV: Lefort, 
C., “L’image du corps et le totalitarisme”, in L’invention démocratique, Paris: Fayard, (1981) 1994, 
pp.172-173). 
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2. The possibility of a comparative reading 
Nevertheless, this paper would like to open the door to such a comparative reading. 
The first reason that seems to justify such a gesture is Leo Strauss: although there has 
never been a direct discussion connecting Kelsen and Lefort, Strauss seems to be able to 
bridge their respective works. Indeed, Natural Right and History – probably Strauss’s most 
famous work5 – is a more or less direct criticism of Kelsen’s legal positivism6. Strauss’s 
criticism of modern social sciences is quite well known: in his view, they are a poisoned 
fruit since they directly lead men to nihilism7. What he in fact denounces is the moral 
relativism that these sciences defend and postulate as the only legitimate rational option 
for men. In this framework, one can understand why, according to Strauss, the Kelsenian 
legal positivism and its rejection of Natural Law constitute a perfect example of modern 
moral relativism. 
Moreover, Lefort reads Strauss’s work with admiration and considers him to be “one 
of the most penetrating thinkers of our time (…)”8. But despite his sympathy for Strauss, 
and although he agrees that relativism can potentially lead to nihilism, Lefort does not 
completely adopt Strauss’s rejection of moral relativism. On reflection, he contends, moral 
relativism can appear to be more than merely a modern inconsistency; it can also be 
interpreted as the consequence of modernity’s ultimate indeterminacy. Therefore, it 
appears to be both the result and the condition of Modern Democracy. 
 
5 See Smith, B. S., “Leo Strauss, the Outlines of a Life” in: Smith, S. B. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion 
to Leo Strauss., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.32 : “Natural Right and History 
remains even today Strauss’s most widely read book.” 
6 See Strauss, L., Natural Right and History, Chicago: Chicago University Press, (1953) 1965, p. 4 fn. 
2. I quote at length: “The assertion that there exists no legal order [Rechtsordnung] in despotic 
regimes, but instead the arbitrariness [Willkür] of the despot, is entirely senseless… since a State 
ruled in a despotic way, also constitutes a certain regulation [Ordnung] of human behaviors… This 
regulation is precisely the legal order. Denying its legal character is only natural law’s naïveté or 
arrogance… What is interpreted as arbitrary is simply the despot’s legal possibility of making every 
decision himself, of determining in an unconditional way the actions of subsidiary bodies, and of 
modifying or repealing at any time the general or even only the particular validity [Geltung] of 
established norms. Such a state is a legal state [Rechtszustand], even if it is judged as harmful. It also 
has positive aspects. The not so unusual call for dictatorship in modern states of law clearly 
demonstrates this.” Since Strauss directly quotes Kelsen in German, I use and complete David 
Novak’s translation here. See Novak, D., “Haunted by the Ghost of Weimar: Leo Strauss’ Critique of 
Hans Kelsen” in: Kaplan, L. V., & Koshar, R., (eds.) The Weimar Moment: Liberalism, Political 
Theology, and Law, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2012, p.395. 
7 See Strauss, L., Natural Right and History, p. 3: “The contemporary rejection of natural right leads 
to nihilism – nay it is identical with nihilism.” 
8 Lefort, C., “Politics and Human Rights”, in: The Political Forms of Modern Society, pp. 239-282, 
p.239. (OV: Lefort, C., “Droits de l’homme et politique”, in : L’invention démocratique, p.45). See also: 
Lefort, C., “La dissolution des repères et l’enjeu démocratique” in : Le Temps Présent. Ecrits de 1945-
2005, Paris: Belin, (1986) 2007, p. 551, where he states that Strauss is one of the rare contemporary 
philosopher who tries to build a political philosophy. Claudia Hilb gives a study of Lefort’s reading 
of Strauss in her article: “Claude Lefort as Reader of Leo Strauss”, in: Plot, M. (ed.) Claude Lefort: 
Thinker of the Political, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp.71-86. 
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If one takes a closer look at Lefort’s definition of Modern Democracy, one sees not 
only the possibility of a comparative reading with Hans Kelsen, but also the possibility of 
articulating the link between Universalist discourses and the concept of Otherness: this 
constitutes the second reason justifying the comparative reading this paper aims to 
achieve. Indeed, according to Lefort, Modern Era is the time defined by the discovery of 
Otherness. In other words, the awareness of Otherness emerges within Modern 
Democracy. In this sense, the moral relativism defended by modern social sciences – or, as 
the paper will show, one might also say the rejection that modern social sciences make of 
universalist discourses – can be read as a direct effect of the entry of Otherness in people’s 
Weltanschauung. This specific attempt to capture the essence of Modernity as the 
particular emergence of the Otherness allows one to read Kelsen and Lefort together. 
The main idea here is to determine whether Lefort’s interpretation of Modernity can 
be applied to the Kelsenian relativistic axiology. If such a comparison works, then it will 
not only give credit to Lefort’s claim that the discourses produced by modern social 
sciences are in fact motivated by and based on the discovery of Otherness, but it will also 
“rehabilitate” Kelsen’s moral relativism9. The latter could then be perceived not as 
inconsistent, but as an example of how a scholar tried to deal with modernity’s radical 
indeterminacy. Furthermore, this comparative reading could also leave room for a new 
interpretation of Kelsen’s moral relativism as compatible with a particular concept of 
Human Rights, namely the modern one. In short, the main goal of this paper is to raise the 
question concerning whether it is possible to combine the awareness of Otherness – i.e. a 
rejection of Universalist discourses – with a form or concept of human universality. The 
ambition here is not to answer, but only to raise this question, animated by the conviction 
that:  
“Genuine knowledge of a fundamental question, thorough understanding of it, is better than 
blindness to it, or indifference to it (…)”10 
 
3. Plan 
In order to raise the question of a potential compatibility between the awareness of 
Otherness on the one hand, and a form of universality on the other, some hypotheses 
should first be formulated and defined.  
 
9 Rehabilitation seems an appropriate gesture since only few scholars consider the moral relativism 
defended by Kelsen to be more than an inconsistency. See for instance: Paulson, S. L., “On the Puzzle 
Surrounding Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm”, Ratio Juris, 13 (3), 2000, p. 293, who considers that, in 
order to defend his separation thesis (between law and morals), Kelsen is not offering arguments 
but only “a crass and vulgar moral relativism”. 
10 Strauss, L., “What is political philosophy?” in Journals of Politics (19), 3, 1957, p.344. 
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1) How does moral relativism equate to the rejection of universal discourses?  
2) Consequently, how can this rejection be understood as a result of Modernity?  
3) How can Modernity be understood as recognition of Otherness?  
The current paper will attempt to outline some answers to these questions based on 
four main texts.  
Firstly, in order to explicate the main lines of the Kelsenian relativistic axiology it 
seems crucial to consider his second edition of the Pure Theory of Law11, since one can find 
within it the grounds for a limitation of human cognition. His Farewell Lecture, “What is 
justice?”12, is also relevant to this theme since in it he claims that the human world is a 
world of relative and conflicting values. The combination of these two ideas leads to the 
rejection of Universalist discourses – identified with the ones of Natural Law theories – in 
the name of science.  
Secondly, three of Lefort’s articles seem to be relevant. The first, “The Image of the 
Body and Totalitarianism”, enables us to understand his symbolic political philosophy, and 
more importantly, to introduce his definition of Modernity. “Dissolution of Marks and 
Democratic Challenge”13 focuses more on the concept of moral relativism, whilst 
interpreting it as a consistent reaction to modern indeterminacy. Finally, “Politics and 
Human Rights” offers a restricted concept of Human Rights, reminiscent of Hannah 
Arendt’s views14, namely that human rights mean the rights to have rights.  
 
11 Kelsen, H., Pure Theory of Law. (M. Knight; Trans.) New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange LTD, 
(1967) 2008. (OV: Reine Recthslehre. Wien: Verlag Österreich, (1960) 2000.) 
12 Kelsen, H., “What is justice?” in What is justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science, 
New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange LTD, (1957), 2013, pp.1-24. One can also listen to the Farewell 
Lecture Kelsen: http://gradlectures.berkeley.edu/lecture/what-is-justice/ 
13 Since this article is unfortunately not yet available in English, we will refer to the original French 
text, and translate some parts of it when necessary: Cf. Lefort, C., “La dissolution des repères et 
l’enjeu démocratique” in Le Temps Présent, pp. 551-570. 
14 Arendt and Lefort’s views are close, but not identical. In fact, Lefort himself mentions that “the 
expression [the right to have rights] is borrowed from Hannah Arendt, although she uses it in a 
rather different sense.” (Lefort, C., “Human Rights and the Welfare State”, in Democracy and Political 
Theory, (D. Macey; Trans.), Cambridge: Polity Press, (1984) 1988, p.37; OV: Lefort, C., “Les droits de 
l’homme et l’Etat Providence”, in Essais sur le Politique, Paris: Seuil, 1986, p. 55). From Lefort’s 
perspective, the right to have rights is understood as the right to claim rights. Hence, the expression 
implies a certain opposition to the power, an opposition needed in order to earn new rights. 
Moreover, this new meaning of right emerges with Democracy. Herein lies the main point of 
disagreement between the two scholars: according to Lefort, Arendt’s use of this expression as 
synonymous with individual rights makes her incapable of embracing social vindications. Indeed, 
the right to have rights is related to her concept of birth: it is within this event – an event that all 
individuals share in common – that lies the notion of universal right. All human beings ought to 
have the right to have rights due to the mere fact that they are born in a human community that, in 
turn, ought to recognize them as its members. In short, Lefort finds the expression to be strongly 
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I. Moral relativism as a rejection of universal discourses: the Kelsenian 
epistemology  
Kelsen’s axiology allows one to consider moral relativism as a rejection of universal 
discourses, particularly the ones defended by Natural Law doctrines. From this 
perspective, the discourses that use universal concepts are considered to be universal 
discourses: this definition is the one that will be used throughout this paper. In Kelsen’s 
view, these discourses are inconsistent. Firstly, they are inconsistent because they go 
beyond the limits of human cognition, and secondly, they dogmatically ignore the human 
empirical world where only relative values exist. 
 
1. The Pure Theory of Law: the limits of human cognition 
Kelsen’s moral relativism is a direct consequence of his scientific goal to build a pure 
knowledge of law. Therefore, his moral position is based on what he considers to be a 
legitimate and scientific knowledge. In this framework, the question of morality is only 
raised because of the question of human knowledge, but how does Kelsen define 
legitimate human knowledge? 
The difference he makes between ‘knowing’ and ‘evaluating’ is helpful here. 
According to Kelsen, to know something is an action not only different from, but also 
contradictory with the fact of evaluating something. When one knows something or tries 
to access such knowledge, one is in fact using their cognition, and the knowledge that 
emanates from cognition is basically a descriptive one: to know something means to try as 
 
related to Democracy, while Arendt thinks it points to a human natural right given by the mere fact 
of being born. With regard to Arend’s expression, see Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, Janovich, 1951. A helpful study that places the expression in the context of the 
entire Arendtian work can be found in both: Birmingham, P., “The An-Archic Event of Natality and 
the “Right to have Rights”.” in Social Research, (74), 3, 2007, pp.763-776 and Birmingham, P., 
Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2006. The latter focuses on the particular difference between Arendt and 
Lefort concerning the “right to have rights” pp. 44-45. On the general opposition between the two 
scholars, see also the following articles by Claude Lefort: “Hannah Arendt and the Question of the 
Political” (1985) in Democracy and Political Theory, pp. 44-55 (OV: “Hannah Arendt et la question 
du politique” in Essais sur le politique, pp. 64-78.); “Hannah Arendt: antisémitisme et génocide des 
juifs” (1982) in Le Temps Présent, pp. 505-528 ; “Hannah Arendt on the Law of Movement and 
Ideology” and “The Perversion of Law” (1999) in Complications, Communism and the Dilemmas of 
Democracy, (J. Bourg ; Trans.) New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp.146-157 and pp.158-
165 (OV: La complication, Retour sur le Communisme, Paris: Fayard, 1986.); “Le sens de 
l’orientation”(1996) in M., Merleau Ponty, Notes de cours sur l’origine de la géométrie de Husserl 
suivi de: Recherches de la phénoménologie. Paris: PUF, 1998, pp. 221-238; “Thinking with and 
against Hannah Arendt” (2002) in Social Research, (69), 2, 2002, pp.447-459. For a short overview 
of some differences between Arendt and Lefort see Flynn, B., The Philosophy of Claude Lefort, 
Interpreting the Political, pp. 255-267. 
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much as possible to grasp it as it is. In this operation, the knowing subject is a subject 
exterior to its object; he plays the role of an objective observer. On the contrary, when one 
evaluates something, one is exercising one’s will: evaluation is an act of human will and 
not an act of human cognition. The nature of human will is prescriptive; it tries to make its 
object in conformity with some desires. Therefore, evaluation is essentially an attempt to 
modify objects: it is an ideological act15. 
To understand how Kelsen equates the pair knowledge/evaluation to the pair 
rational/irrational, one has to keep in mind the main distinction he makes in his Pure 
Theory of Law, namely between Sein and Sollen. According to Kelsen, only the world of Sein 
can provide a rational knowledge. In other words, only knowledge of laws as they are is 
reachable for man. An approach of laws as they ought to be is typically what Natural Law 
doctrines attempt to reach, and such an approach is unacceptable from a scientific point of 
view since it is not based on human reason, but on human will. It delivers an object that is 
modified by human desires, and it does not tell us what the object is, but what a particular 
human being wants it to be. Here Kelsen builds a dichotomy between the world of Sein and 
the world of Sollen on a meta-theoretical level: this dichotomy is used in order to draw the 
boundaries of the theory of law itself. This determination of the framework in which the 
theory could constitute itself as legitimate and scientific means the strict restriction of 
human cognition to the world of Sein. In short, according to Kelsen, a legitimate human 
knowledge is in fact a description of how things are – and particularly, in the case of his 
legal science, of what laws are16.  
How does this particular Kelsenian epistemology lead to the rejection of Universalist 
discourses? The meta-theoretical separation of Sein and Sollen is a strong claim presented 
against Natural Law theories, and in Kelsen’s view, the main characterization of such 
theories is to pretend to detain an absolute and hence, a universal concept of justice. If one 
agrees with Kelsen on the limits of human cognition, then one also rejects, not only any 
Natural Law theory, but also any human attempt to grasp universal concepts. In other 
words, if human cognition is limited to the world of Sein, then all Universalist discourses 
are immediately discredited. It is needless to say that such a view implies a particular 
definition of the empirical world: this world must not contain universal concepts.  
 
15 In the first edition of the Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen already claims how his scientific ambition is 
strongly opposed to ideology, and therefore, why the science of law can only be a descriptive one. 
See: Kelsen, H., Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, (B. Litschewski, S. L. Paulson; Trans.) 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1934) 1997, pp. 18-19. (OV: Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die 
rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, (1934) 2008, II, §9, pp. 29-30). 
16 From this perspective, the pure theory of law is a legal positivism since it aims only  
to consider the positive law. For different aspects of legal positivism and its roots, see:  
Green, L., “Legal Positivism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/legal-positivism/ and Hart, H. L. A., 
“Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, New 
York: Oxford University Press, (1958) 1983, pp. 49-87. 
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2. “What is justice?”: the human empirical world as a world of relative and conflicting values 
Kelsen is fully aware that the latter claim demands some justifications. These are 
explicitly brought in his Farewell Lecture: “What is justice?”. The main claim of this writing 
is to assert that the human world is a world of conflicting values. From this perspective, 
one’s practical decision appears to be only a personal preference or the result of a 
determinate emotive state, since it is rationally impossible to decide which values are 
higher17. Applied to the concept of justice, such a claim means the rational impossibility 
for human beings to know or to define an absolute justice. As such, what is considered 
depends solely on a cultural or historical context. In fact, philosophical history gives proof 
of this18: multiple and diverse moral concepts have been defended from Plato until Kant, 
and despite these great thinkers’ efforts, no consensus about what is just and what is 
unjust has been reached. The main reason for this lack of universal consensus about 
justice resides in the fact that: 
“The absolute in general, and the absolute values in particular, are beyond human reason, for 
which only a conditional, and in this sense relative, solution of the problem of justice (…) is 
possible.”19 
Although it is impossible to decide absolutely which values are better in order to 
behave, this does not mean human practical life is condemned to nihilism, to the absence 
of values. The Kelsenian moral relativism is not amoral or immoral. On the contrary, it 
consistently calls for human responsibility: if all values are potentially good or bad, then 
one has to decide on one’s own and choose carefully with what values one wants to 
conduct one’s life. Here the concept of tolerance intervenes as a rational criterion: 
tolerance is the only concept that is able to assume all moral conceptions in their diversity 
and multiplicity. Tolerance means welcoming the moral, religious, or political viewpoints 
of others: it means trying to understand opinions and beliefs of other human beings, 
especially the ones we do not share. In the end it becomes the condition of possibility for a 
 
17 This position is clearly and explicitly stated in the General Theory of Law and State: “There is no 
possibility of deciding rationally between opposite values. It is precisely from this situation that a 
really tragic conflict arises: the conflict between the fundamental principle of science, Truth, and 
the supreme idea of politics, Justice.” H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, London: Oxford 
University Press, (1945) 1949, p. XVI. Once again, this idea is not new since Kelsen already stated it 
in the first edition of the Pure Theory of Law, where he claims that from the perspective of rational 
knowledge, one can only see conflicts of interests. When one is resolving a conflict, one is in fact 
electing an interest, and abandoning another one. Cf. Kelsen, H., Introduction to the Problems of 
Legal Theory, p.17. (OV: Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, p. 
28.) 
18 See: Idem (OV: p.27); Kelsen, H., “Foundations of Democracy” in Ethics (66) 1, 1955, pp.1-101, p. 
98 footnote 70; H. Kelsen, “What is justice?”, p. 21; H. Kelsen, “The Natural Law before the Tribunal 
of Science”, What is justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science, p. 153. 
19 H. Kelsen, “What is justice?”, p.10. 
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pacific expression of everyone’s opinions. According to Kelsen, “[t]olerance means 
freedom of thoughts”20, and therefore, the ultimate possibility of democracy itself. If 
tolerance cannot tell men how they should behave, or what values are higher – since this is 
not its role – it allows them at least to live together peacefully. It forces them to wonder 
and to question under what form of justice they want to live. Moreover, it requires them to 
look for a compromise: it demands that they give up their own personal interests – since 
personal interests necessarily mean conflicts of interests – in order to seek a general 
interest.  
One should underline how Kelsen’s conclusion at the end of his Farewell Lecture is 
fully consistent with his rejection of an absolutist conception of values. Indeed, he formally 
defines his own position as a preference: a preference for democracy, a preference for 
tolerance. 
“Since science is my profession, and hence the most important thing in my life, justice, to me, 
is that social order under whose protection the search for truth can prosper. “My” justice, 
then, is the justice of freedom, the justice of peace, the justice of democracy – the justice of 
tolerance.”21 
Moreover, since his moral standpoint is a preference, it is then debatable. The 
rejection of Universalist discourses based on the limits of human cognition is the condition 
of a moral and political debate. In other words, since we do not know absolutely what 
justice is, we have to try to find a form of justice that allows us to live together. 
II. Modernity as ultimate indeterminacy 
In order to see how Kelsen’s views can be interpreted as an effect of Modernity, one 
must first define Modernity. Claude Lefort’s political philosophy seems to offer a fruitful 
insight into it.  
 
1. Modern Era: experiences of irreversibility and uncertainty 
According to him, in the Modern Era men are confronted with two sorts of 
experiences. The first one is the feeling they have of irreversibility, namely a feeling that it 
 
20 Ibid., p. 23. 
21 Ibid., p. 24. For a debate on this conception of tolerance, and the problems it raises, see: J. Bjarup, 
“Kelsen’s Theory of Law and Philosophy of Justice” as well as Pettit, P., “Kelsen’s Theory of Law and 
Philosophy of Justice”, in Essays on Kelsen, pp. 273-304 and pp. 305-318. Leo Strauss also stresses 
the inconsistency of the concept of tolerance defended by modern social sciences: Strauss, L., 
Natural Right and History, pp. 12-13. 
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is impossible to return to the Past. This feeling is correlative to a sense of future that is 
completely new compared to the Classical Era. Lefort is not saying that Pre-Modern 
societies do not have a sense of future22. He is far from defending ethnocentric / colonialist 
/ racist views, and does not deny a temporality in Pre-Modern societies: such societies 
have an experience of the Past, as well as the Present and the Future. In this sense, Pre-
Modern and Modern societies do not differ because the latter have a history and not the 
former. The difference resides elsewhere: what distinguishes Pre-Modern from Modern 
societies is the respective ways that political power is articulated within them. In other 
words, while Pre-Modern societies are the theater of complete determinacy, the Modern 
Era is the place where all possible markers are dissolved. This difference between, on the 
one hand, a world of determinacy, and on the other hand, a world of indeterminacy, 
becomes clear when one focuses on the symbolical role political power has in these 
societies.  
In the Pre-Modern era, the representation one has of one’s social group and of one’s 
world, is strongly dependent on the political power. Political power is the symbolic force 
that holds the ultimate keys of the legitimate and illegitimate, of the just and unjust, of the 
truth and untruth. In other words, it clearly and strictly defines the representations people 
have of reality. This has a direct consequence on the way people experience temporality: 
since the political symbolically determines everything, then the Past, the Present, and the 
Future are not blurred; in fact, their definitions are given. To get a glimpse of how people’s 
Weltanschauung is symbolically shaped by the political power, a look at Lefort’s 
description of the figure of the king may be helpful.  
 
22 One cannot suspect Lefort to agree with the unfortunately famous assertion that some societies 
are living in an immediate present. In other words, some societies would not have a historical 
perspective. This is a problematic claim because in the best-case scenario it is inconsistent. When 
one is claiming that other societies do not have a sense of History, it is most of the time to set a 
comparison between their own society and others. Therefore, it is not surprising that such a 
comparison leads to the conclusion that other societies are not as good as their own. It is not a 
surprise because what one is doing in order to come to such a conclusion is to judge other societies 
with the criteria of its own society. Hence, one’s society is already established as superior since the 
only criteria taken into account belong to their society, and not to the others ones that are judged. 
Such a thought is therefore a pure product of an ethnocentric perspective. One has to wonder what 
the relevance is of a comparison between societies when the result is fixed in advance, when the 
criteria of comparison themselves are ideologically selected.  
In the worst-case scenario, this difference between societies that have a sense of history and those 
that do not have knowledge of it is politically dangerous. This difference can potentially serve to 
draw a line between so-called “advanced”, “progressive”, or “civilized” societies, and the other ones. 
When “sense of History” becomes a criterion of civilization, one is therefore faced with a colonialist 
and/or a racist ideology. A perfect example of this trivial stupidity is Nicolas Sarkozy’s Speech in 
Dakar in 2007, and in which the former French President professed: “the African man has not yet 
entered history”. The comparison is no longer oriented towards differences of habits, culture, so on 
and so forth; rather, it focuses directly on human beings. Such a thought implies that there are 
human beings who are more human because they take part in History, while other human beings 
are less human because they are ignorant about what History is. One can easily imagine what kind 
of actions this discourse can justify. 
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2. The symbolic role of the king 
The king plays a crucial role in the Monarchy. If one focuses on the system of 
representations that is inherent to such a political society, one will see that it represents 
itself as a mystical body. It is because of this representation of themselves as part of a 
mystical body, that members of such societies were able to live together. Consequently, 
people represented themselves as part of the king’s body. At the same time the king was 
also the head of this social body, since he was completely merged with the political power. 
Therefore, the king was the warranty of “both organic and mystic”23 social unity: he 
incarnated and thereby conferred an identity and a unity to the social order. In this sense, 
without the symbolic figure of the king, the social order could not be an order since the 
social body cannot exist without him, without people’s identification with him. This also 
means that every member perceived his/her own identity, his/her own essence as 
depending on this representation: one’s identity is defined by the place one has in the 
social body. 
In short, one can see here that the king is the one who draws society’s limits as well 
as its identity; a proof of that is the fact that he essentially determines who is a member of 
the society, and who is not. Moreover, his discourse builds a symbolic reality that shapes 
society’s representation of itself: what the king says determines both how the members of 
society perceive reality and how they live in it. The important point one should retain is 
that the king is the ultimate marker of certainty in Monarchic societies; his discourse and 
his actions have a direct determining consequence on society. Nothing is indeterminate in 
such societies because of the role of the king.  
“The ancien régime was made up of an infinite number of small bodies which gave 
individuals their distinctive marks. All these small bodies fitted together within a great 
imaginary body for which the body of the king provided the model and the guarantee of its 
integrity. The democratic revolution, for so long subterranean, burst out when the body of 
the king was destroyed, when the body politic was decapitated and when, at the same time, 
the corporeality of the social was dissolved. There then occurred what I would call a 
‘disincorporation’ of individuals.”24 
The emergence of universal suffrage means a change regarding the symbolic 
configuration of the society and a new place for power. In Monarchies, the king occupied 
the place of power, for he was a man that society considered at the same time mortal and 
immortal, individual and collective, a man who had an absolute legitimacy since he earned 
 
23 Lefort, C., “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism”, p. 302. (OV: “L’image du corps et le 
totalitarisme”, in L’Invention démocratique, p.171). 
24 Ibid., p. 303. (OV: Ibid., pp. 171-172). 
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it from God. With Modern Democracy, such a conception of the political power becomes 
simply impossible since the popular sovereignty ensures that legitimacy no longer comes 
from a transcendent pole, but from society itself. Moreover, the place of power is no longer 
occupied indefinitely since people who are elected, are designated for a determined 
amount of time. Furthermore, everyone has the potential to be elected, and as such, the 
political power becomes a matter of competition. Lefort’s most famous definition of 
Modern Democracy, as societies where the place of power is empty, makes sense in this 
context. The democratic place of power is an empty one since it is a place that is occupied 
only temporarily, and by men who are by definition mortal – if one wants to occupy this 
place definitely, one has then to “cheat”, to use “force or cunning”25.  
It will lead us too far from the main point of this presentation to further explain 
Lefort’s conception of Democracy. The main idea one should retain is that Modern 
Democracy is the place where the political power is facing disincorporation. And since 
there is no longer a king to shape people’s Weltanschauung, the members of Modern 
Democracies cannot count on anyone except themselves to find definitions of the 
legitimate and illegitimate, of the just and unjust, of the truth and untruth. As a result, the 
disappearance of the king means the disappearance of the ultimate markers of certainty. 
Getting back to the idea of temporality, one can now fully understand the difference 
between Pre-Modern and Modern societies: the latter cannot count on any determinacy 
for they are literally facing the unknown. The future from now on appears to be both an 
enigma and an unsettling object. 
Conclusion: The possibility of a sense of Universality? 
 
1. The implicit philosophy within modern social sciences: the awareness of Otherness 
If one applies this conclusion to Kelsen’s writings, then one will be able to interpret 
his moral relativism as a result of Modern Democracy. Moral relativism is a thought that 
emerges at a time when men lost all their traditional markers of certainty. The Kelsenian 
call for men’s responsibility echoes such loss: since there is no longer anybody to claim 
what justice is, one has to discover it by oneself.  
 
 
25 Idem. (OV: Ibid., p. 172). 
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“This, of course, implies a very serious responsibility, the most serious moral responsibility a 
man can assume. Positivistic relativism means: moral autonomy.”26 
But doesn’t this call on others to assume responsibility presuppose the recognition 
of others as similar human beings? In other words, when Kelsen tries to remind men of the 
importance of questioning the concept of justice, does he not in fact conclude that every 
man has the potential to accomplish such a task? Does he not mean implicitly that every 
man is equal regarding this potential capacity to question things?  
“They [modern social sciences] can claim that social phenomena are like things, affirm an 
ideal of objectivity or scientific neutrality. What underlies these requirements? It is the 
discovery of the Other who, as such, is also a kind of fellow-man (…)”27 
No longer defined as merely a part of a social body, the Otherness is from now on 
considered as a different and independent entity: this is the perspective that Modern 
Democracy brings. According to Lefort, all these positivistic attempts to reach a scientific 
knowledge of men and human facts are motivated more or less implicitly by this 
philosophy. Modern social sciences derive their strength from the awareness of the others 
as fellow men. The moral relativism they lead to should be rejected as though it means 
nihilism. But, in the end, it seems that there is an acceptable form of relativism: that is, the 
one that makes us question others, take their perspective, in order to look back at our own 
thoughts, our own perspectives, to question ourselves and maybe even revise our judgments. 
This is the strength of Modern Democracy; it forces us to acknowledge the Otherness and 
its real place. This acknowledgement is only possible if the Otherness is recognized as 
equal to the Self, if one can perceive in others their common humanity. What else can the 
Kelsenian conception of tolerance mean except this? When one welcomes the views of 
others, one implicitly presupposes that these views are worth welcoming: a common 
humanity between men is thereby presupposed. 
 
2. Human Rights as the utterance of rights 
Only in this Modern framework where the social world, in order to be shaped, 
requests the expressed opinions of every one of its members, can the question of Human 
Rights be reformulated. It would not be consistent to define Human Rights as rights that 
are given by an ultimate authority such as the king or God. In fact, there is no way of 
properly defining Human Rights in a socio-political context where every single value is 
debatable. However, does this mean that such Rights do not exist? Lefort contends that the 
respective symbolic status of the law and the political power have changed with the 
 
26 Kelsen, H., “Foundations of Democracy”, p. 97 footnote 70. 
27 Lefort, C., “La dissolution des repères et l’enjeu démocratique”, p. 556 (my translation). 
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emergence of Democracy. Democracy is this new configuration of a society where men can 
demand to be allowed to speak and to publicly express their opinions. Kelsen’s preference 
for Democracy is fully compatible with such a view since it is based on the fact that men 
cannot be certain of what is right and what is not. They are therefore placed in the position 
of debating together in order to determine what is legitimate and what is illegitimate. 
“Only if it is not possible to decide in an absolute way what is right and what is wrong is it 
advisable to discuss the issue and, after discussion, to submit a compromise.”28 
According to Lefort, this means that the legal question is now located beyond the 
reach of the political power. This does not mean however that the political power has no 
influence on laws, or on deciding which laws ought to be prescribed. This only means that 
the society is the force where the question of laws first emerges. The source of the law has 
changed in Modern Democracy, precisely because Modern Democracy emerged with the 
claiming of rights coming from society, namely the claim for universal suffrage.  
 
3. Human nature as an enigma 
Getting back to the notion of Human Rights, one can give a new definition that is 
neither metaphysical nor dependent on Natural Law theories. The concept of Human 
Rights does not mean anything more than the ability to claim rights, or the utterance of 
rights. It does not presuppose some kind of nature of things, or some kind of human 
nature, namely, a fictive nature-in-itself. Such concepts are no longer consistently possible 
when one takes into account both Lefort’s views on Modernity, and Kelsen’s criticisms of 
Natural Law theories. If the ultimate markers of certainty are lost, then human beings are 
also subject to indeterminacy. Indeed, they cannot rely on something or somebody to 
determine who they are, or what their roles are. Thus, in the Modern Era, human nature 
also becomes an enigma.  
“The idea of human nature, which was so vigorously proclaimed at the end of the eighteenth 
century, could never capture the meaning of the undertaking inaugurated by the great 
American and French declarations. By reducing the source of right to the human utterance of 
right, they made an enigma of both humanity and right.”29 
 
28 Kelsen, H., “Foundations of Democracy”, p. 97 fn. 70. 
29 Lefort, C., “Human Rights and the Welfare State”, p. 37. It is meaningful that Lefort uses the 
concept of “enigma” because of its Greek root: αἴνιγμα comes from αἰνίσσομαι that means, “to 
speak in riddles”. The linguistic aspect involved in the Greek root can be found also in the 
humanism defended by Lefort: according to him, Modern Democracy acknowledges the fact that 
when human beings are talking or debating with one another, there is a part of the discourse that is 
inherently evasive. In other words, discourse of Otherness is essentially always ambiguous and 
mysterious; its speech as well as its essence is condemned to be something that one can never 
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entirely grasp. These ungraspable dimensions of human discourse and essence make one realize 
how different one is from the others. This radical difference means also that one is condemned to 
be alone: “Man cannot forget solitude.” (Lefort, C., “La dissolution des repères et l’enjeu 
démocratique”, p. 567. my translation.) Despite its heavy weight, this modern solitude also has a 
positive effect: “Nonetheless, there is a useful form of solitude tied to the institution of democratic 
society. Man alone can be drowned in the crowd, but it is also there that he is called upon to realize 
he is different.” (Idem.) 
Of course, this way of presenting the philosophy of Lefort seems to suggest a certain “family 
resemblance” between his views, and the ones of Sartre. Indeed, the aforementioned quote is 
reminiscent of the following lines of Existentialism is a Humanism: “(…) when we speak of 
“abandonment” – one of Heidegger’s favorite expressions – we merely mean to say that God does 
not exist, and that we must bear the full consequences of the assertion.” (Sartre, J. P., Existentialism 
is a Humanism, (C. Macomber; Trans.), New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2007, p. 27. (OV: 
L’existentialisme est un humanisme, Paris: Folio, (1945) 1996, p. 37) This familiar resemblance is 
invalid in my opinion, especially if one carefully reads how Sartre defines his philosophy. In fact, 
two main aspects of his definition put him in clear opposition with Lefort. The first aspect is the 
emphasis he puts on human subjectivity: “(…) [E]xistentialism is a doctrine that makes human life 
possible and also affirms that every truth and every action imply an environment and a human 
subjectivity.” (Ibid., p. 18 ; OV: Ibid., p. 23) According to Sartre, human beings are condemned to be 
free and are therefore responsible for their choices. This freedom of choice is something that Lefort 
does not postulate. Moreover, it is not because of this kind of freedom that Lefort deduces the 
modern solitude, he rather attributes it to the loss of the markers of certainty, and therefore, to a 
political change that is Modern Democracy. Thus, while one author defends subjectivism, the other 
establishes a hermeneutic of social and political changes. Hence, the two standpoints are different, 
and do not assume the same assertions. The second aspect that allows one to evaluate how the two 
scholars are defending different views is the concept of humanism. According to Sartre, his 
existentialism is a humanism based on the concepts of freedom and responsibility: “(…) we can 
claim that human universality exists, but it is not a given; it is in perpetual construction. In choosing 
myself, I construct universality; I construct it by understanding every other man’s project, 
regardless of the era in which he lives.” (Ibid., p.43 ; OV: Ibid., p.61) Despite the fact that human 
beings are condemned to choose in their environment, that is here and now, each of their individual 
choices involves the whole mankind. When one chooses, one does so assuming that one’s choice can 
be universalized to mankind. In short, existentialism is a humanism since an individual’s choice 
engages not only himself/herself, but also mankind in general. Hence, one can see how the 
existentialist’s humanism is different from Lefort’s. According to the latter, it is not our condition 
that allows us to transcend our subjectivity. In fact, the point of departure is radically different: 
Lefort does not begin with human subjectivity, but with social, economic, and political conditions. 
These conditions explain why the human being becomes an enigma (while, for instance, Sartre 
attributes the same fact to the death of God). What links human beings to one another is not 
primarily their freedom of choice or their responsibility, but their history. This historical 
determination does not prevent one from transcending it, although History has continuity since It 
always raises the same universal questions. Therefore, “(…) we can, in different situations, through 
different historical and cultural conditions, find problems that are timeless; and the idea that there 
is, in addition, a correct interrogation of what has to be thought is what mobilizes all of us, i.e. the 
idea that there is something today that needs to be thought and transcends our differences.” 
(Lefort, C., “L’automne du totalitarisme”, in Le Temps Présent, p. 650, my translation.) According to 
Lefort then, it is not because of Modernity or Modern Democracy that human beings are enigmas. 
They have always been enigmas, however, Modern Democracy is the first social situation to 
acknowledge and to embrace this fact. In Lefort’s view, freedom is not conceived primarily as a 
freedom of choice, but as a political freedom i.e. the birth and the extension of a symbolic public 
space. (See Lefort, C., “La liberté à l’ère du relativisme”, in Le Temps Présent, pp. 631-655). 
Finally, even though this discussion is not directly linked to the present topic, it is difficult to 
present the main differences between Sartre and Lefort without mentioning the intellectual dispute 
the two scholars have about the French Communist Party, and that took place in Les Temps 
Modernes. Sartre published two articles where he proclaimed his engagement with the Communist 
Party, while Lefort expressed his disagreement with the political party in 1953, in his article 
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Human nature and law become enigmas since what they are is no longer considered 
predictable: once debates are opened and defined as places where decisions are taken, no 
one can predict with certainty what results they will lead to. Nevertheless, do we not have 
here a kind of universality? Even though we do not know, and cannot determine, what 
human nature is, we seem to presuppose that such a thing exists and therefore, we are still 
trying to bring determinations to the table. By accepting and trying to work for a 
democratic social life, we in fact assume the indetermination of human nature. 
Nonetheless, we do not abandon such an idea since it somehow represents the condition 
of the possibility of Democracy itself30. Therefore, have we not reached – precisely because 
of the awareness of Otherness – a universal concept of Human nature? Can we not say that 
modern men are universally enigmas? 
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An invitation to a workshop is – in my understanding – also an invitation to 
speculation. It’s place – and the German idealists understood and theorized this – lies not 
in the written, but rather in the spoken word, ideally in front of an audience of speculative 
co-workers. I would thus like to seize this unique occasion and speculate about Europe, 
from the point of view of political theology. The question I would like to raise is the 
following: How can the concepts of political theology apply to today’s European politics? 
And what does this mean for Europe’s self-conception?  
I will start with a clarification: political theology should be understood not as a 
complement to political philosophy, but as being very distinct from it. Unlike political 
philosophy, political theology grounds “the political” on a unique event in history, namely 
God’s revelation and – in the case of Christian political theology – the incarnation of Christ. 
Thus, political theology does not begin with man and his essentially political nature, with 
intersubjectivity or some other particular disposition of his mind, but with God as the 
unquestionable reason and center-point from which political theology derives its concepts 
and motivation. Different theological conceptions (Christianity, Islam, Gnosticism, etc.) call 
for different political theologies: theocracy; co-existence of the worldly and the spiritual 
powers; or sovereignty.  
This last form of government is, in the context of political theology, associated with 
the name of Carl Schmitt, the German jurist and philosopher who played an important role 
in the legalization of the constitutional system of the Third Reich, but whose writings have 
nevertheless continued to inspire thinkers after the War. Schmitt’s definition of the 
sovereign as he who decides upon the state of exception, is probably the best-known part 
of his 1922 work Political Theology. Along with its second best-known bit, according to 
which all key concepts of the modern theories of the state are secularized concepts, it 
indicates the general outline of his political theology: namely that of a vast critique of 
enlightenment and modernity, of the autonomy of its political conceptual set, which – and 
this is its sign of weakness – has to pilfer constantly from theology in order to continue to 
function and to maintain itself. Political theology reveals the arbitrariness in the use of 
modern political concepts, the sheer emptiness behind the conceptual construction of 
modern political philosophy and the degree to which this illegitimate and blind use has 
estranged it from its original theological founding. Political theology is, at least in its 
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Schmittian conception, a profoundly anti-modern project. How then could a profoundly 
modern project like Europe be connected to political theology?  
Here, I would like to pick up a thought developed by Etienne Balibar in a 2012 
article1 In his article, Balibar discusses the incessant movement of de-theologization and 
re-theologization inherent in Hobbes’ construction of the Leviathan as a “mortal God”, 
whilst drawing a parallel to our political conjuncture, especially with regards to the 
problem of laicism, secularization and Islamophobia in today’s Europe – the assumption 
being of course that Hobbes’ theory and Schmitt’s interpretation can help us to grasp the 
dialectics of power and to understand Europe’s problematic standpoint regarding this 
question. 
One must bear in mind, of course, the profoundly paradoxical structure of Hobbes’ 
Leviathan2. In its claim for absolute control (meaning total sovereignty), the State (or the 
monarch) must alienate every power claim of its people, especially the power claims of 
organizations and communities – and especially the claims of the clerical institutions. In 
order to abolish the state of nature – that means the state in which every single set of 
beliefs has the same claim for authority as the set of beliefs of your neighbor – the 
personal beliefs must cease to be public and become as private as possible. These beliefs 
wander into the “box room” of the moral consciousness, and so does the people’s power 
openly to criticize the State/Monarch.3 In order to guarantee its protection, the State 
cannot accept any form of authority claim or open form of resistance by the people. Its 
moral and critical faculties must be “privatized” – the citizen has to become a subject.  
Considering its famous frontispiece, the biblical reference and the key-role of the 
anthropological fiction of the “state of nature” (as an anti-Paradise), one can understand 
how Hobbes’ Leviathan takes over the metaphorical and mythical language of religion to 
turn it against itself. The State – in order to diminish and depotentiate the power claims of 
religion and of popular organizations – adopts theological attributes and replaces the 
“original” systems of belief by a form of “religion of the State”. The more a community is 
organized around a single belief and the bigger its authority claim is, the more the State 
has to adopt its characteristics in order to occupy its position. This “metaphorical” 
strategy results, on the one hand, in a monopole of power by the State that has constantly 
to assert its authority through the identification of “public enemies”. On the other hand, 
the moral and critical power of the people become sheer polemics, meaning a powerless 
form of critique unable openly to and thus effectively contest matters of state – and be 
 
1 BALIBAR, É., “Le Dieu mortel et ses fidèles sujets. Hobbes, Schmitt et les antinomies de la laïcité”, 
in: Gonthier, Th. (dir.), Ethique, Politique, Religions, 1 (2012), pp. 27-39. 
2 Cf. Ibid., pp. 29-32. 
3 Cf. KOSELLECK, R., Kritik und Krise. Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt, Frankfurt a. 
M.: Suhrkamp, 1973. 
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contested by the sovereign. To put it simply: the State/Monarch is to blame for nothing, 
but is responsible for everything. The citizen is responsible for nothing, but to blame for 
everything. The citizen becomes hypocritical; the State becomes hypertheological. This gap 
between public and private is at the root of a permanent crisis inherent to this political 
model and the paradoxical power-strategies that try to overcome it.  
In reference to Schmitt’s famous characterization of “the Political” as the possibility 
always to distinguish the enemy from the friend, Balibar emphasizes the importance of the 
permanent identification of a “public enemy” for the modern State. This search is not only 
directed towards the outside of the State, but also – and this is important – towards its 
inside. (This is, in fact, characteristic of our political conjecture, in which the “inner” 
enemy has grown to be more threatening than the “outer” enemy.) To prevent the whole 
construction from being internally destroyed; to keep the homogeneity of a morally and 
politically “privatized” individual, the inner enemy has to be defined. According to Balibar, 
this is precisely the function of the theologization of the enemy.4 It is only under the 
theological form that the outer enemy can be projected to the inside of the state, thus 
giving the threatening impression of a vast “community of believers” infiltrating and 
endangering the “community of individuals”. By projecting this figure on the “alien 
elements” of the State, it creates the supposedly uncontrollable public enemy (as opposed 
to the controllable private individual). And with a new enemy comes concomitantly a new 
strategy to defeat and subjugate (meaning subjectivy) it. All this creates the paradoxical 
situation of a secular state, which through the theologization of the enemy adopts its very 
characteristics; a state that becomes more and more theological – divine – itself.   
Doesn’t this remind us of recent developments in today’s spectrum of right to far-
right wing Europe? Isn’t one of its dominant tropes the dissociation from Islam (i.e. 
Turkeys long time wait for membership), not only to the outside but also to the inside? 
Isn’t it striking that in the last few months, thousands of Germans have gathered for 
weekly protests against the alleged “Islamization of the Occident”, under the name of 
“PEDIGA” (meaning: “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of Occident”) – and has 
been growing into a popular mass-movement with the participation of the far-right wing 
parties?  
It seems to me – and this is the “speculative part” of my talk – that the difficult 
question of the European identity has become a question of legitimacy more than a 
question of legality. Furthermore, this legitimacy has been found in the depths of the 
alleged Judeo-Christian heritage. Europe’s – and especially Western Europe’s – members 
seemingly require an arch-foundation, namely a new theological-political Urstiftung. This 
need, however, is derived from the nature of the theologized enemy who – according to 
 
4 Cf. BALIBAR, op. cit., pp. 37-39. 
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Balibar5 – is projected on the cultural, sociological and historical differences in our 
diversified societies. In other words: Europe has begun to derive its legitimacy from the 
illegality of its enemy.   
It is here that I would like to introduce the very peculiar theological-political 
concept of the katechon.6 The concept appears in a personal and an impersonal sense in 
the second letter to the Thessalonians, c. 2, v. 3-9. I would like to quote the entire passage 
(in its modernized translation):  
“Don’t let anyone deceive you in any way, for that day will not come until the 
rebellion occurs and the man of lawlessness („a-nomos“) is revealed, the man doomed to 
destruction. He will oppose and will exalt himself over everything that is called God or is 
worshiped, so that he sets himself up in God’s temple, proclaiming himself to be God. 
Don’t you remember that when I was with you I used to tell you these things? And 
now you know what is holding him back („to katechon“), so that he may be revealed at the 
proper time. For the secret power of lawlessness is already at work; but the one who now 
holds it back („ho katechon“) will continue to do so till he is taken out of the way. And then 
the lawless one will be revealed, whom the Lord Jesus will overthrow with the breath of 
his mouth and destroy by the splendor of his coming. The coming of the lawless one will 
be in accordance with how Satan works.“ 
As we see, the katechon is the principle that stands against the apocalypse, meaning 
here the revealing of the Wicked (the “a-nomos”), who will have the power of Satan. 
Grippingly, the a-nomos is already amongst us, but has not yet begun to function: the 
nature of the apocalypse is unknown, but the “illegality” is already at work (“amongst us”). 
The katechon can thus be defined as he who “detains”, who “slows down” the apocalypse 
by “holding back” (Zurückhalten) the a-nomos. According to Carl Schmitt, the belief in a 
katechontical power is the centerpiece of every truly Christian conception of history. It is 
the bridge between our world and the world after God’s judgment. As a worldly power 
with a heavenly function, it is what dynamizes history and overcomes the “eschatological 
paralysis”7. The katechon is thus part of the theological answer to a situation of crisis (in 
the sense of Ent-zweiung) – and, in a certain way, “bears the tension” (die Spannung 
aushalten). Schmitt now integrates this figure into history, claiming that this function has 
been occupied by several powers (or persons) throughout the ages, (for instance the Holy 
Roman Empire, holding back the ottoman conquerors).  
 
5 Cf. Ibid., p. 37. 
6 In fact, Balibar’s article begins with the mention of the concept of Katechon, and his conception of 
a State that has constantly to hold up the revolution through the identification of the inner enemy is 
a concrete definition of the concept in the current political situation.  
7 SCHMITT, C., “Drei Möglichkeiten eines christlichen Geschichtsbildes”, in: H. Blumenberg – C 
Schmitt, Briefwechsel, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2007, p. 164. 
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This highly problematic historicization of the katechon is a sign for the craftiness of 
political theology: the katechontical function does not, in fact, emerge out of a complex 
play of power-relations, but has simply to be occupied, to be “seized”. The position has its 
own legitimacy. But in the “secularized” and politicized version of the story, the 
eschatological fear has definitively lost its potency: what remains are the katechon and the 
a-nomos, the legitimacy and the illegality. Not only does the katechon lose its defusing 
intention, but perpetuates and aggravates the original crisis that can only be resolved by 
God’s universal judgment, by his Ent-scheidung (de-cision).8 In other words: the katechon 
exists in and through the permanent crisis, meaning the permanent inability to decide – 
the eternal indecision. Deprived from the tension between here and “there” (Aushalten), 
the holding back (Zurückhalten) changes into repression and subjugation (Niederhalten). 
Furthermore, the time-conception has changed: the hopeful waiting for the End-times is – 
in Schmitt’s – transformed into an anti-dialectical standstill between enemy and friend.  
Since we lack the idea of an eternal and universal salvation, since – in the post-
modern political conjuncture – it is not about all or nothing anymore, katechontical 
politics – and this is my point – provides the illusion of decision (and thus dynamism) 
where there can only be eternal delay. Its mission, although “legitimate” from an alleged 
higher standpoint, is an infinite one sans real historical progress. This is why Giorgio 
Agamben has opted for a re-insertion of the mysterium iniquitatis into an eschatological, 
historical context, urging every single actor of the katechontical drama to take his 
responsibility towards the future, thus freeing the “a-nomos” from the timelessness and 
amorality of its theological institutionalization.9 Hans Blumenberg – in his correspondence 
with Schmitt – understands the katechon on the contrary not as a lever for eschatological 
belief, but as its pure negation, as a strategy to cope with the frustration resulting from the 
long overdue apocalypse. The Agambian concept of an “incessant drama” (unablässig 
abspielendes Drama), the bearing of an infinite tension, is incompatible with Blumenberg’s 
revalorization of the “humane” dimension of historical and political action.  
In conclusion, a last question: Could it be that with the new search for legitimacy 
amongst European nations, that with the reference to our “original values” and the alleged 
Leitkultur comes the will to take over a new role in history, to “find back” into history – 
and this in the form of a new understanding of the katechon? In order to answer to this, we 
would have to more clearly define this procedure of “taking over a role” (a conscious or an 
unconscious process, etc.). Nevertheless, the tendency in Europe’s foreign policy to 
redefine the nature of its borders, the popular mass-movements, kindled by the right wing 
parties (whose cry for a “stronger”, more decisive government might even be understood 
 
8 Cf. AGAMBEN, G., Pilate et Jésus, Paris : Rivages, 2013, p. 98. 
9 Cf. AGAMBEN, G., Das Geheimnis des Bösen. Benedikt XVI und das Ende der Zeiten, Berlin: Matthes & 
Seitz, 2015, pp. 57-59. 
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as a cry for the final judgment), the tendency to define a common enemy – namely the 
Islamic belief – and to project it into the inside of Europe, finally the State’s inability to 
handle its “alien elements” on a strictly legal level and to find legitimacy not in the 
discontinuity of the future – meaning essentially an EU as a community of social justice – 
but in an undead concept of nationality and “cultural identity”  – all these moments can be 
seen as signs of a certain return of theological concepts into politics.  
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At times in the evenings a face 
Looks at us out of the depths of a mirror 
Art should be like that mirror 
Which reveals to us our own face. 
Jorge Louis Borges 
 
Introduction 
The presence of the so-called Islamic headscarf in the European public sphere 
epitomizes probably one of the most interesting contemporary conflicts in the human 
rights universe. The appearance of visibly veiled women in public places in Europe has 
been greeted with hostility. In the European public space, we find different ways of 
accommodating the presence of the veil, they do vary amongst different member states 
and such differences to a large extent reflect their constitutional and political traditions. 
There is the laïcist solution in France banning (all) religious symbols, at the other end of 
this axis, we find Britain, which allows the presence of religious symbols in the public 
sphere without significant restrictions. The symbolic and political stakes of the legislation 
that has been passed on the account of the presence of the veil in the European public 
sphere are undoubtedly high. The presence of the veil and the responding laws adopted in 
many European states raise fundamental questions about European identity, the concept 
of secularism, gender as well as touching upon the legacy of colonialism. In a nutshell, it 
provides a space for critical reflections about the politics of ethnicity, gender and religion 
in Europe. It has gradually become an arena of strident debates and passionate clashes. 
Wearing the veil has predominantly been interpreted as an expression of anti-Western 
and anti-modern attitudes. The veil tends to be framed as a threat to public order and to 
the secular order of liberal democracies.  
Unfortunately the discussion about the multitude of cultures in Europe, about the 
European project and its identity and the place of emerging cultures and (their) values is 
often reduced to simplistic debates such as “hijab: to ban or not to ban?” or “the 
construction of Minarets: to ban or not to ban?” The reductive tone of these debates, which 
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run along simplified trajectories laid down by the still dominant liberal discourse signified 
by the popular assumption about the qualities of the liberal public sphere and the values 
which form it, is received as an affirmation of the dominance of the traditional norms and 
values which govern the use of public reason. In the following pages, I put forward, against 
this received paradigm, arguments showing that the ensuing liberal theory of minority 
rights, which goes hand in hand with the afore-mentioned understanding of the public 
sphere, in fact not only reduces the issues that emerge with the presence of the “other”, as 
represented i.e. by the veil, but that it, hand in hand with the liberal rights discourse, tends 
to remove certain considerations from the debates we lead in Europe, a tendency, most 
visibly represented by disputes over religious symbolism. What the language and 
structure of universal human rights (i.e. represented by the European Convention on 
Human Rights), through which these issues are problematized, achieves is to put aside the 
“unspoken, implicit borders and the stigmatizing exclusionary power structure of the secular 
public sphere.”1 What are the questions that should be posed and what the social costs and 
shortcomings at stake are here, is the main focus of this paper. 
 
Boundaries and Bodies  
The way in which the on-going discourses which touch upon the issue of the veil, 
have evolved, reflects the quite recent pronouncements by governmental leaders in 
Germany, Britain, and France, which state that the adopted policies of multiculturalism 
have “failed”, in the famous words of Angela Merkel “This [multicultural] approach has 
failed, utterly failed." With the recent developments we can detect a market shift, in the 
public, political and judicial discourse in the perception of the veil, which has gone from a 
religious symbol to a political metaphor par excellence for the refusal of the newly 
emerging minorities to embrace European values as well as their determination to assert 
the visible presence of Islam in Europe. The dynamic that we witness almost everyday in 
the mass media fit quite well with what Claude Levi-Strauss describes as “hot moments”. 
These moments do not automatically emerge as objective realities, but instead “result from 
the individuals and groups whose discourses assign meanings and social significance to 
events regarded as benchmark moments or historically notable occasions”.2 In other words 
they illustrate significant instants in the narration through which different groups in the 
social order, be it the nation as a whole or different dominant cultural, political or religious 
groups, re-invent and assert their own positions. This effort is propelled by the inherent 
propensity of such domineering groups, operating at different levels of the social strata 
 
1 GÖLE, N., “Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries,” Public Culture 14 (2002), pp. 
173-190. 
2 LEVI-STRAUSS, C., The Savage Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, p. 259. 
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and across the social order in place, to re-appropriate the dominant ideological 
conceptualization of the public sphere. In this way, the collective body as well as every 
individual subject part-taking in the process of observing the presented “moments”, 
contribute significantly to the formation and representation of the meaning ascribed to 
the hijab and its position vis-à-vis the imagined European community.  
Anthony Giddens writes about a people’s identity as “a narrative about themselves”. 
Identity is a story one tells to one-self and as well as to others. Notice the double bind 
Giddens is presenting us with. Narratives not only serve to create an image, that is an idea 
about the storyteller in the eyes of the spectator, but also help the storyteller to assume 
her own identity as well. That story is partly objective and real, partly imagined and 
subjective. Identity is indeed a narrative, but in order to be credible to others, it often 
refers to content, which reflects the existing and available particles we find in the public 
discourse. Therefore, regardless of whether it reflects truth or expresses it, identities as 
constructs refer to the array of underlying structure available in the fabric of the society 
and as such clearly indicate the purpose to establish a pattern, a structure, which is 
accepted by those who they share the public sphere with. Just as personal identities both 
reveal and conceal the depths of human subjectivity and serve as a way to connect to the 
existing grid of the larger framework of available identities (heterosexual, European, 
queer etc.) that make up the polis, so do these identities we turn towards, reveal and 
conceal our intentions, needs and histories. And if narratives both reside within 
individuals and emerge at the same time from their subjectivity in larger framework of the 
polis, they too exert their dominance across many aspects of our lives, by imposing 
external boundaries, particularly by re-inscribing our singular actions into larger 
narratives and signifiers. 
Another aspect of the role and function of identity to be mentioned before we can 
move on is the performative aspects of identity.3 The public sphere represent a primary 
forum, where identities are formed as well as dispersed, through performances of 
subjectivities and their visual displays as well as through validation and authorization by 
the audience. But, Muslims emerging in the European public sphere perform new forms of 
subjectivity with reference to different collective memory and identity; immigrants are 
culturally distinct from traditional European cultures, values and perceptions.4 
Discursively constructed boundaries retain significance which goes beyond the traditional 
confines of nation states and in a sense go much deeper, connecting to the very fabric of 
European identity. What becomes more crucial than policing boundaries of states or even 
communities and their rights, is the struggle for what we could call “discursive power”, the 
 
3 BUTLER, J., Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex", Routledge, 1993, p. 12. 
4 SAINT BLANCHAT, Ch., „Islam in Diaspora: Between Reterritorialization and Extraterritoriality“, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2002), p. 138‑151. 
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power to decide, who defines the meaning and extent of rights of a given ‘community’, how 
is such a community constructed, which narratives become foundational and why certain 
other narratives are left out. The power relations that are inscribed in the relationship 
between audience and narrator create not only the content of particular identities but also 
their position in the wider scale of liberal society. Boundaries of this kind make, of course, 
some things visible and other invisible. Rancière explains, “Politics revolves around what is 
seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, 
around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time.”5 This brings us back to the 
question of authority and to the question of who has the authority to interpret meanings. 
In this sense, the public spaces themselves become constitutive features of the manner in 
which identities are defined, both the (successful or unsuccessful) reproduction of social 
values or norms and the emergence of new ways of seeing and thinking through patterns 
of identity formation.6 On this reading, politics is first of all the configuration of a given 
space as political and polemical, which has the capacity to frame a specific sphere of 
experience as well as the positioning of identities, stories and modes of argumentation as 
"common" as well as of the subjects who are recognized as having the capacity to discuss 
them.7  
Western Orientalist discourse, in times of colonization, rendered Muslim women, 
who were veiled, as exotic and installed the veiled faces as a centre of exoticism. In 
Orientalism8 Said shows both i) how Orientalism as an institutionalized discourse was 
created to provide knowledge about the Orient and the Oriental in order to have power 
over this ‘Other’ and ii) how the knowledge of the Other was created out of an ideological 
construction combining fear towards the ‘Other’ with an imperialistic outlook of the 
Oriental domain. The veil thus became a space within which the Western Orientalist 
narratives could be played out and through which the meaning of the veil as well as the 
emerging (other) identities could be looked at, seen and its meaning could be occupied 
with supposedly universal validity.9  
The conceptualization of the so called l'affaire du foulard has, over the years, passed 
through an evolution of arguments, ranging from the questions of the separation of the 
church from the state to the respect and equality for women. It was only later, given the 
recent geo-political development in the world that the la question du foulard islamique has 
been interpolated as a ‘negative identity’; Muslim women´s bodies and their attire now 
bear the brunt of a more generalised anxiety about fundamentalism, somehow, in the 
popular imaginary, the veils and terrorist acts have become inseparable from one another 
 
5 RANCIÈRE, J. Politics of Aesthetics: New York: Continuum, 2006, p. 8. 
6 Ibidem, p. 12 -20. 
7 RANCIÈRE, J. On the Shores of Politics, London/New York: Verso, 2007, p. 54. 
8 SAID, E., Orientalism. New York: Pantheon, 1978. 
9 VIVIAN, B., “The veil and the visible”, Western Journal of Communications 63 (2): 115- 139. p. 122. 
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- the laws forbidding the niqab and burka in public places, are a culmination of the gradual 
hardening of public and political attitudes towards veil dressing in general. An 
examination of the veil bans serves to map the terrain of European politics, and the veil a 
site of bio-political control in the construction of public space, formulated as a wish to 
preserve the existing dominant narratives in place.  
 
The Conditions of Human Rights Law 
If societies communicate their meanings through the formation of social imaginings, 
than these are also shaped in relation to other significant modes of communication. Such 
interactions take place within a more generalized and collective history, in which 
particular memories are privileged and preserved, while others are cast away and 
forgotten. Those, which gain wide acceptance, become widely available for the meaning 
making of the present discourse. As Lewis says: “this ‘pre-existing library of meanings’ that 
are held within culture might equally be understood as the invisible ‘boundary’ which shapes, 
and is shaped by, the individual and collective consciousness of a given social group.” Lewis 
also uses Bourdieu and how he highlighted the ability of the dominant social groups to 
read their values and meanings into the particular practices of the wider public sphere.10 
Thus identities which are the product of collective imagination, never come to be as 
neutral entities, they are always laden with meaning and reinforce the distinctions that are 
implied in the process of producing meaning, images and signs and as such take over the 
imaginative faculties of the polis. Meaning thus created and their audience, are engaged in 
complex processes of social and political exchange, at the end of which, one meaning 
which is representative of a certain narrative, emerges as one which becomes privileged 
over others. Public sphere and its inventions as well identities we found there, different 
communities and their foundational values, they all result from the interrelations with and 
between others – other identities, other communities and other values – and as such the 
identities and elements we find floating in the public space are co-constitutive of the wider 
framework as well as the dominant meanings.11  
This note can perhaps capture some of the importance of the ‘visual claim’ made by 
the presence of Islamic artefacts in the public space, sometimes called Islamization, which 
represents temporary conjunctions of the previously unrelated elements.12 Bourdieu 
notes and this is an important point to be made here, that different groups have greater 
and lesser access to the properties of construction and dissemination of such images, a 
point to which we return later in the text. Therefore, that which is habitually called, 
 
10 LEWIS, J., Cultural Studies. The Basics, Los Angeles/London: Sage, 2008, p. 5. 
11 MASSEY, D. For Space, London: Sage (2005), pp. 9-10. 
12 Ibid, p. 141. 
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“Islamization” of European public sphere is perhaps better described as a process of  
‘(re-)inscription’ of ‘old’ space with ‘new’ (Islamic) meanings13 While it is certainly the 
case that not all veil wearers have political intentions, they do, by their very presence in 
the public space, challenge the normative “regime of visibility,” as Rancière puts it. The 
veil is not necessarily a visible object; rather, it is rendered visible through a particular 
one way of seeing.14  
The citizens of the polis create and define their polis through deliberative debate 
and creative performance in the present, but the city invariably testifies to the presence of 
the past by its contemporary form. The manner in which and how these traces of other 
times and different spaces become relevant, depends mostly on how the spaces of debate 
get constructed and what constitutes them. The foundational myths of (political) 
communities are forged from common stories, memories and grounds on which the polis 
can build their self-perception and self-description as well as the classification of the 
newly emerging narratives and identities. Those meanings cannot be observed directly as 
they are located in people's heads and get actively created in the social interactions and 
relationships which are formed and expressed by various forms of (symbolic) modes of 
expression.  
Various interpretations are available for framing the matter as cultural, religious, 
racial and/or gendered. One of the most natural methods and languages for addressing 
l'affaire du foulard is the language of European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or 
“Convention”), more specifically its article 9. As a space for both the production of 
meaning and social interaction, human rights form an important terrain in which various 
modes of agency, identity, and values are subject to negotiation and struggle, and open for 
creating new democratic transformations. The language of human rights through which 
contemporary cultural diversity is often described, has, however, become increasingly 
problematic as a dominant tool in addressing these issues, particularly because migrant 
minorities tend to be variously incorporated, licensed, excluded, or assimilated within the 
existing symbolic boundaries of the polis, using the very same language which is said to be 
the major tool of recognition. Therefore, we need to search for vocabulary capable of 
capturing the changing cartography of the multicultural polis.  
However, translating social issues into legal claims has an own dynamics. 
Translating social issues into legal cases may modify them in more or less profound way. 
Law can only process a social issue it is presented with if it is translated on law’s own 
terms and conditions - that is in legal terms and with reference to the dominant narratives 
effective within the legal discourse. The law typically never contests the givens of the 
 
13 MCLOUGHLIN, S. “Mosques and the public space: conflict and cooperation in Bradford”, Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(6): 1045-1066: p. 1045. 
14 VIVIAN, B., The veil and the visible, p. 130. 
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situation, or what Rancière calls the “partition of the sensible”. What the law can provide is 
mostly a debate on how certain rights should be implemented.   
Interpretation of the law is powered by its interaction with the existing system of 
beliefs and underlying scheme of intelligibility.15 There are diverse means through which 
individuals and groups can engage actively in the contestation and remaking of the 
dominant order of the polis. In that way, the presence of different narratives contests the 
routine models of government in place and as such disturb the existing distribution of the 
weight, which is assigned to different narratives found in the public sphere. Rancière calls 
that particular distribution the ‘police’. The police provides an institutionalization and 
distribution of systems of language, systems of behaviour, and systems of hierarchy as 
constantly self-legitimating entities. The police order is more than the uniformed officers 
of the state: it includes everything from the media and social mores, to theological values 
and cultural practices. Indeed, the “essence of the police … is not repression but rather a 
certain distribution of the sensible…”16 What is important here is that the police order is 
dependent upon the pre-defined and pre-existent forms.17 The police order is based on 
stability, which effectively restricts our perception to legitimated ways of thinking, ways of 
speaking, ways of seeing, and ways of being. Every society is constructed upon a “system of 
self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something 
in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it”18. 
 
Narrated bodies and veiling 
The veil is an instant problematization of the body, because it presents the (covered) 
body to the world as a predicament. The hijab does not tuck the woman away completely 
and absolutely – it displays her body, while at the same time keeping her under wraps, 
covered. This traumatizes the viewer with its unapproachability, in which the experience 
of interaction is marked by the absence of a (present) face, for the face has been 
historically considered the repository of identity and selfhood. The face does not simply 
stand for the assortment of features that organize our faces (and more importantly lend 
them their unique difference) but is rather a signifying space, which acts as an anchorage 
for the intersubjective relations it enters into.19 A nun’s habit does not arouse the same 
 
15 DAVIDSON, D., Belief and the Basis of Meaning, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 141-54, pp. 183-98, pp. 245-64. 
16 RANCIÈRE, J., The Politics of Aesthetics, p. 89. 
17 "There are those who play the game of forms (the vindication of rights, the battle for representation, 
etc.) and those who direct the actions designed to eradicate this play of forms." RANCIÈRE, J., 
Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1999), p. 87. 
18 RANCIÈRE, J., The Politics of Aesthetics, p 12. 
19 ŽIŽEK, S., The Plague of Fantasies, London: Verso (2008), pp. 86 -127. 
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kind of anxiety because it has the one meaning which is accessible to our imaginary 
horizons, its meaning has been settled. Roland Barthes explains that, “the wearing of an 
item of clothing is fundamentally an act of meaning that goes beyond modesty, 
ornamentation and protection. It is an act of signification and therefore a profoundly social 
act right at the very dialectic of society”.20 Dress and fashion are considered the ultimate 
expression of modern freedom and yet this particular piece of dress – the veil - is 
forbidden, “it is precisely the normative connections that are, in the final instance, the 
vehicle of meaning. Dress is essentially part of the axiological order”21 The notion of 
signification is quite central to any social/religious/cultural interpretation of hijab. Gail 
Lewis argues that in the European context, the immigrant woman symbolizes the 
archetypal non-European subjectivity that threatens the imaginary of Europe and its 
compactness.22 This is an important factor in the reception of the presence of the veil, 
particularly against the backdrop of the recent development in Europe in which the 
presence of visibly non-European woman (non-white/non-Western/non-Judeo-Christian) 
imposes itself upon the prevalent symbolic imaginary and thus disrupting the existing 
order of things.23  
Humans make personal and social meanings and identities by constructing stories 
that allow for the plurality of elements to gain some form.24 And as such, the nature and 
content of such story making is not arbitrary. Rather, it relies on the structures of 
narrative (in place) to which individuals are exposed and the way in which individuals 
make meaning of the social and political through the construction of such stories. "Self-
understanding is an interpretation; interpretation of the self, in turn, finds in the narrative, 
among other signs and symbols, a privileged form of mediation; the latter borrows from 
history as well as from fiction, making a life story a fictional history or, if one prefers, a 
historical fiction, interweaving the historiographic style of biographies with the novelistic 
style of autobiographies."25 Identity forged, established and expressed via narratives thus 
occupies a middle ground between neutral description and ethical prescription.26 The 
complaining veiled woman is not merely the one who tells the story, or merely the one 
about whom the story is told, but she "appears both as a reader and the writer" of her life.27 
Thus, the individual is the interpreter and the interpreted, as well as the recipient of the 
relevant interpretations. Human rights are also always a politics of fantasy - like religion, 
 
20 BARTHES, R., The Language of Fashion. Translated by Andy Stafford. Edited by Andy Stafford and 
Michael Carter. Berg/Power Publications, 2006, p. 97. 
21 Ibidem p. 7. 
22 LEWIS, G., Imaginaries of Europe, Technologies of Gender, Economies of Power, European Journal 
of Women’s Studies, 13(2), Spring (2006), pp. 87-102. 
23 Ibidem. 
24 BRUNER, J., Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life, Harvard University Press 1990. 
25 RICOEUR, P., Oneself as Another, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1992, p. 114. 
26 Ibidem, pp. 114-115, pp. 152-168. 
27 RICOEUR, P., Time and Narrative III. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1987, p. 246. 
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‘the assumptions that determine our political regulations [are] illusions’.28 So human rights 
also and always dwell in the realm of fantasy, of the imaginary. The next question 
concerns the precise role of narratives (such as human rights) vis-à-vis audience. Is the 
role of human rights to interpret the problems societies face and facilitate a ready-made 
recipe? Or is the concept of human rights, rather, an incentive, something that activizes the 
polis and is therefore promoting concrete social change? 
  
Normalising Fictions 
Social life is storied; stories or narratives are crucial to that process. The networks 
through which social life is storied are constituted through stories and action in relation to 
times, the selves and the settings. Some narratives of course carry more weight than 
others; Butler29 refers to these dominant narratives as ‘normalising fictions’. Such stories 
actively shape (and are in turn shaped by) particular understandings of the world, which 
are prevalent in the polis and as such are prioritised over other stories, when it comes to 
the creation of self-identity. Thus privileging of certain perspectives defines realities for 
some people, constructs identities and affects the way people enter the public sphere and 
are perceived by others30.  
There is a marked tendency in the discussions about the role of the veil, the 
emerging identities and narratives to fetishize the law, as the ultimate answer to the 
received predicament. All kinds of public figures and academics love these 'cases' and 
those 'rights' since they lend structure, meaning and sense of identity. The result of this 
enthusiasm is that we tend to discuss the ‘cases’ rather than the totality of the issue at 
hand. The great advantage of the law and human rights law in particular reduce the 
complex social issues into a human rights dispute in which the right to X is discussed. 
Human rights and the Strasbourg system represent a widely accepted narrative about 
Europe and its values. Such reference to values which are predominantly accepted as 
universally valid, even though they represent only a particular historical experience and 
normative discourse nonetheless allow for the ambivalent, shifting, contextual reality of 
contemporary Europe to take shape which fits within the dominant narrative. Human 
rights law instantly invokes (human) 'rights', which are treated as a consistent 
representation of universally valid rights, rather than as a set of contested norms, which to 
a large extent represent the than dominant narrative. Human rights cases bring with them 
the tendency to reduce the multitude of the case into a seemingly clear statement of a 
(moral) issue, with a tendency to ignore the complexities - since the law has a tendency to 
 
28 FREUD, S., The Future of An Illusion (1927), Volume xxi, p. 34. 
29 BUTLER, J., Gender trouble. New York: Routledge, 1990. 
30 WARNER, M., Publics and Counterpublics, New York: Zone Books, 2002, pp. 121-22. 
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subsume the world within its limited remit and not vice versa. Paradoxically, human rights 
allow for justifying the status quo in Europe against the backdrop of interests, positions, 
needs, all grounded in a plurality of legitimate perspectives, because they are commonly 
perceived as universally valid and transcending precisely these particular elements – they 
express important part of our identity.  
To give an example, the 'case', which is subject to a court decision, is not the same as 
the topic of the minaret prohibition in the Swiss constitutional amendment referendum. 
To understand such disputes we need to understand the specific political, regulatory, or 
judicial procedures, the politics therein, the regulatory schemes around it, the actors 
involved, the discourses and the governance arrangements. Human rights law thus 
reduces the presence of the veil in the public domain to an abstract narrative of “key facts” 
and “the law” applicable thereto. The facts of the case are already the filtered version, 
which lawyers and judges construct. Suddenly there is only the case of the one particular 
veil, translated into the language of the liberal paradigm of human rights as mostly 
negative entitlements, saturated by Euro-centric identity which privileges certain 
expression of subjectivity over others. Conflicts in human or fundamental constitutional 
rights are always also sites of struggle, not just a statement of conflicting principles or 
rights.  
The relationship between the visible presence of the veil and the dominant 
narratives in the public sphere is necessarily concerned with what Rancière calls the 
distribution of the sensible and is defined by the “delimitation of … the visible and the 
invisible …”31 The word “sensible” relates to what is seen but also to what is enabled; it 
refers to the actions or expressions a society finds acceptable – it encompasses a wide 
array of modes of operation. It effectively distributes “ways of being and ways of doing, 
ways of feeling and ways of thinking, with nothing left over"32 "by performing an imitation of 
politics in negating it."33  
Rancière reminds the reader, that the dynamics that propel the workings of 
democracy necessarily “revolves around what is seen”.34 The act of veiling is for all to see – 
it disorders sedimented appearances and makes some things appear different from the 
way they appeared before. Whereas Rancière's police defines the polis as unified and 
whole, the emergence of the veil and the symbolic message it carries, contests the very 
notion of the prevalent definition of the community. These emerging narratives than in 
turn engage the paradigm in place and engage it on many different levels - thinking, 
speaking, and acting. And it is precisely their difference, presented in the public sphere, 
 
31 RANCIÈRE, J., Disagreement: Politics And Philosophy, p. 13. 
32 Ibidem, p. 68. 
33 Ibidem, p. 65. 
34 Ibidem, p. 13. 
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which verifies them as equal subjects and helps to reconfigure the existing social 
coordinates.35  
The visible presence of the veil can than be, with Rancière, captured as a process of 
subjectification: when those occluded from the political community constitute themselves 
as equal subjects and in turn disarticulate and reconfigure the dominant narrative.36 To 
better understand this, it is perhaps a good idea to step back a little and consult one the 
most influential intellectual aspiration of Rancière - Arendt’s notion of plurality and its 
correspondence with action. Arendt explains, “Plurality is the condition of human action 
because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as 
anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.”37 And further, Arendt says: “Human plurality, 
the basic condition of both action and speech, has the twofold character of equality and 
distinction.”38 We are all equal but distinct as well. Arendt shows that the need for speech 
and action to be understood and communicated with others as one of the basic 
foundational elements of the “human condition”. 
 
Conclusion: Unexpected Meaning 
Doctrinal answers to conflicts around the issue of the Islamic veil differ less on the 
level of the law and more on the level of whether and what kind of socio-cultural aspects 
are employed in the concrete legal decision. Much of the controversy surrounding the veil 
is the result of how the image of the veil gets interpreted in the public domain. The veil, as 
a polysemic sign, often elicits strong reactions for a variety of reasons, largely depending 
on the individual or group doing the interpretation. Jacques Lacan, in his famous essay, 
"The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud,"39 demonstrates how 
symbols with conventional meaning can be transformed, in order to further precisely the 
societal consequences it has come to signify in the first place. To demonstrate this, Lacan 
shows how public (Western) bathrooms always have two doors, one with a silhouette of a 
woman, and the other with that of a man. The original denotative significance of the male 
and female shapes was originally designed to designate which sex should use which toilet. 
However, Lacan expounds on the meaning of these signs to show how they have over time 
been expanded to include a larger societal meaning. Effectively, these signs become larger 
 
35 ‘‘politics exists because those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings make themselves 
of some account, setting up a community by the fact of placing in common a wrong that is nothing 
more than this confrontation, the contradiction of two worlds in a single world: the world where they 
are and the world where they are not’’ in Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, p. 27. 
36 RANCIÈRE, J., Hatred of Democracy, London: Verso, 2006, p. 13. 
37 ARENDT, H., The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 8. 
38 Ibidem, p. 175. 
39 LACAN, J., The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud, in: LACAN, J., Ecrits: A 
Selection, W.W. Norton & Co., New York 1977, p. 150. 
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than their original denotative meaning, which (only) assigned each sex different public 
restroom. Such “foundational” gesture later evolved to include the representativeness of 
culture and gender. 40 
Regulation of veiling thus plays an important symbolic role in defining dominant 
identities. In a number of rulings on the issue of the veil, the European Court of Human 
Rights has allowed that their appearance and visibility might legitimately be restricted by 
member states. What is distinctive is that out of so many of the fundamental elements 
which enter the question of the presence of the veil in public (discourse) the process of 
adjudication revolved primarily around the topic of the regulation of women, gender, 
sexuality and the family. Women and their bodies have become the crucial symbolic 
moment in constructing group identity not only of the so called immigrant minorities but 
also of the dominant modes of perception and (self-) identification which can use this in 
order to further the dominance of their values.41 This in turn invites a defensive response 
to the increasing pressures of assimilation and secularization, leading the communities of 
newcomers to define their collective identity in uncompromising terms that portray any 
“unorthodox” interpretation of the tradition threatening the very survival of the identity of 
such group. Under such conditions, the veil becomes a contribution in communicating and 
establishing a group’s “culture” and a symbol of group´s integrity. It is crucial to 
understand this dynamic in order to better comprehend the pressures that are imposed on 
women within such minority cultures. Images of gender, sexuality, and the family 
frequently become symbols of such groups’ “authentic” cultural identity.  
The Woman has once again become the paramount symbol articulating the social 
and political tensions. Women legal status figures as a pivotal concern, serving as a 
political axe to execute competing power rivalries. The bans are one example among many 
of the struggles between social and political forces seeking to transform (or preserve) the 
balance (or imbalance) of power. Interestingly, the construction of "us" and "them", the 
struggle over identity, is in these cases linked to the struggle over gender identity.42 
Suddenly gender roles demarcate the line between "them" and "us" – and the veil: The 
dominant narrative constructs the modern, gender-egalitarian "us" against the pre-
modern, sexist and patriarchal "them". On the other hand, the Muslim minority cultures in 
Western Europe construct the "us" using the veil against the "decadent" "them". From this 
perspective how the national courts as well as the European Court of Human rights were 
not deciding primarily about the empowerment of women and securing gender equality. It 
seems that the decisions were designed to make a clear distinction in the dispute about 
 
40 Ibid., p. 151. 
41 SHACHAR, A., Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights, Cambridge 
University Press (2001), pp. 45-62 
42 BENHABIB, S., “Borders, Boundaries, and Citizenship”, Political Science and Politics, Vol. 38, No. 4 
(Oct., 2005), pp. 673-677. 
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competing worldviews and political, institutional, ideological, cultural, and religious 
power contest.  
All humans are natural storytellers. We have been telling stories since the beginning 
of time as a way of passing down beliefs, traditions and history to future generations. 
However, narratives are not just vehicles for informing about how events transpired in the 
past, it is also a vehicle for constituting reality and of conferring meaning on experience. 
Paul Ricoeur, reflecting on Walter Benjamin’s essay “The Storyteller” writes: “The art of 
storytelling is the art of exchanging experiences; by experiences, [Benjamin] means not 
scientific observations but the popular exercise of practical wisdom. This wisdom never fails 
to include estimations, evaluations that fall under the teleological and deontological 
categories…in the exchange of experiences which the narrative performs, actions are always 
subject to approval or disapproval and agents to praise or blame.”43 Writing and sharing 
stories is an exercise of discursive power. In creating narratives we transfer and create a-
new judgments of actions and characters of others, of those who play part in our stories. 
As such, telling a story has two dimensions - it is descriptive and normative. Since the 
stories through which we form our symbolic world are linked to other people, we become 
frightfully dependent on the decisions and desires of others who tell their stories. 
Let’s close this paper with the introductory words of Hannah Arendt to her book The 
Human Condition: “What I propose in the following is a reconsideration of the human 
condition from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears. This, 
obviously, is a matter of thought, and thoughtlessness – the heedless recklessness or hopeless 
confusion or complacent repetition of “truths” which have become trivial and empty – seems 
to me among the outstanding characteristics of our time. What I propose, therefore, is very 
simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing.” 
 
43 RICOEUR, Oneself as Another, p. 164. 
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Introduction 
The French Revolution inaugurated a new paradigm in political theory and political 
science, by inventing new concepts and reshaping reality. The great dichotomies of left 
and right, the ideals of equality, freedom and fraternity, which became symbols of 
democracy and democratization, were invented at the heart of Europe. Since then, any 
democratic project has relied on this theoretical apparatus. Popular sovereignty, which 
was firstly embraced, even if not with successful results, during the French Revolution, 
became a problem in the 20th century. After overcoming – even if only to some extent – the 
experiences of totalitarianism and fascism in Europe, this new political subject – Europe as 
a whole – had to reinvent modern democracy.  
The project of the European union was a result of a set of very clear commitments to 
political and social ideals: on the one hand, embracing democracy as chosen and 
preferable political model, as way of guarantying peace among states1; on the other hand, 
endorsing the liberal modern vision of fundamental individual rights. 
The Charter of the European Union (2000) rests upon an articulation of liberal and 
republican elements: it is built upon a discourse of individual rights, while assuming 
shared values, which are the ground for the construction of the European community. This 
European project must rely on the interdependence between the ideals of liberty, equality, 
but also, the ideal of fraternity, which today appears as ‘solidarity’, insofar the creation of a 
community must encompass economic, social, political and cultural dimensions.  
Although the main political documents of the European Union embraces the ideals 
of liberty, equality and fraternity, European practices seem to neglect or having forgotten 
what the ideal of fraternity really means. Any discourse on solidarity appears as a set of 
beautiful words with no content, or, if they have content, this is generally considered 
‘utopian’ and inefficient. The ideal of equality has also been neglected: only a part of the 
concept – its ‘formal’ and ‘legal’ side, linked to the freedom of the market, free circulation 
of persons, goods and capital and competition – is promoted, while the ‘social’ and 
 
1 See DAHL, R., On Democracy. Yale University Press, 2000. 
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substantive part of it is seen as an obstacle to achieve in a sustainable manner specific 
economic and financial goals.  
In this paper I want to argue that if we want to rescue the European project we must 
activate and translate into practices the articulation between these three ideals, having as 
larger background a strong conception of justice, which cannot be defined in a strictly 
legalist manner. In order to do so, I will start by presenting Rawls’ account of the 
importance of the ideal of fraternity, an ideal which is the necessary (even if not sufficient) 
condition for the consolidation of a democratic project; I will then move to a critical 
analysis of current European state-of-affairs that suspend the fraternity ideal, therefore 
putting in check the success of the European project; finally, I will reflect upon recent 
challenges Europe faces today and look for its possible (re-)solutions. 
 
I. Liberty, equality and fraternity in Rawls 
Rawls’ theory combines a defense of personal freedom with political equality, with a 
strong recognition that these values can only be accomplished and realized within a set of 
social, political, legal and economic structures. By articulating the private/personal sphere 
of individual rights with the public sphere as horizon where individuals shape themselves 
and find the conditions to constitute their own subjectivity in an ideally autonomous 
manner, Rawls introduces a rupture in the discourse of justice. Contrary to the social 
contract tradition from which Rawls departs, namely, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, which 
approached justice through the individual perspective (i.e., ‘justice’ applied to particular 
actions of individuals), Rawls considers justice as the necessary condition that shapes the 
basic structure of society – its institutions – and which consequently set the boundaries 
between what is ‘just’ and what is not in a community. 
In A Theory of Justice (TJ) Rawls starts from the assumption that human beings are 
social creatures; therefore, the defense of individual rights must be made from the point of 
view of a fair system of social cooperation, which guarantees the basic settings for a 
decent life. But what constitutes a decent life? Clearly, Rawls does not want to tell us what 
is the life worth living; instead, he defends the priority of justice over the good. Why? First 
of all, because ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of 
thought.’2 Given that ‘each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even 
the welfare of society as a whole cannot override’3, justice transcends the disputations 
about different conceptions of the good life. Justice is the virtue that creates the space 
 
2 RAWLS, J., A Theory of Justice (from now on TJ), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, 
p. 3. 
3 Idem. 
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where different concepts of the good can emerge, meet and dialogue. This position 
eradicates any theory of justice grounded on utilitarian arguments, given that nobody can 
be sacrificed in the name of the ‘welfare of society’.  But what would be a good theory of 
justice? Clearly one that is capable of affirming itself through the self-evidence of its 
principles. In order to accomplish this Rawls proposes us a hypothetical situation – the 
social contract taken to a more abstract form: Imagine that you don’t know anything about 
yourself – you don’t know if you’re a man or woman, rich or poor, talented or stupid, with 
or without a disability. Under such conditions (of the veil of ignorance) in this hypothetical 
‘original position’ (the methodologically equivalent to the ‘state of nature’), what 
principles of justice would you choose in order to set the basic structure of society?  
I will not enter into Rawls’ detailed account of this process. The important point to 
retain is that these principles that will be chosen – or recognized as valid and legitimate – 
are principles that can and will be shared by individuals with different conceptions of 
good. A community – in the strongest sense, namely, embracing the political, cultural, 
economic and social dimensions – can only be viable, stable and efficient if there is a basic 
but strong agreement regarding the foundational principles that support its own (re-
)construction.  
Therefore, the primary subject of justice – social justice – is the basic structure of 
society, i.e., ‘the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights 
and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.’4  
Rawls understood that it is impossible to disentangle rights/duties from distributive 
aspects. Since the French Revolution and during the 19th century, for instance, equality 
and freedom were parts of the same coin: fraternity pointed to a strong republican 
conception of citizenship, as translating the (today’s lost) ideal of the general will. Between 
the 19th and the 20th century many structural transformations happened in Europe, 
perhaps the greatest of all the introduction, development and consolidation of capitalism. 
While the 19th century was committed to the Enlightenment project of human 
emancipation, capitalism in its advanced form brought these expectations down to earth. 
The ideals – and their respective ideologies – of freedom and equality became 
progressively more apart, and freedom turned out to be a nice word that covered new 
forms of individual and collective exploitation, a more ‘civilized’ slavery, which produced 
radical inequalities in distribution of wealth, but also of primary goods. Therefore, Rawls 
understands that in order to rescue the Enlightenment project (even if that was not his 
specific agenda), in order to rescue the discourse of modernity, even if by transforming it, 
it was crucial to re-conceptualize the relationship between the ideals of freedom, equality 
 
4 TJ p. 6 
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and fraternity, on the one hand, and to envision a practical way of translating this 
reconfiguration in a system of social institutions and social practices.  
The conditions set by Rawls – the original position and the veil of ignorance – assure 
that human beings are equal ‘… as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their 
good and capable of a sense of justice.’5  These conditions allow us to bring light upon the 
kind of agreement and principles that we would, in fact, accept. These principles are:  
“First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. 
Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and b) attached to positions and offices 
open to all.” 6 
The first principle – of equal basic liberties – has priority over the second principle, 
which means that freedom cannot be sacrificed for the sake of economic advantages, for 
instance. This is what Rawls refers as serial order with the first principle prior to the 
second.  
Rawls insists on this serial order and argues that these two principles express an 
egalitarian conception of justice.7 Unlike the system of natural liberty, which is regulated 
by the principle of efficiency (i.e., assuring that the total amount is fully distributed, 
regardless of how this distribution is made), and starts from the initial natural and social 
assets allowing both to create radical inequalities; and unlike the liberal system, which 
tries to mitigate the influence of social contingencies by imposing certain requirements 
(for instance, formal equality in accessing careers) but is incapable of addressing the 
problem of natural inequalities, Rawls advances a democratic interpretation of freedom, 
which is translated in the difference principle. 
As the author says ‘… the intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and 
secure the more attractive prospects of those better-off unless doing so is to the advantage 
of those less fortunate’8. This means that, in the first place, nobody ‘deserves’ to be 
talented or born in a nice family, ‘the natural distribution is neither just nor unjust …’.9 
Since nobody is entitled to the privileges one is born with, there is a (moral) duty to 
understand talents, skills, strengths, as belonging to the ‘common good’, i.e., to the society 
as a whole. Rawls clearly says that ‘… the difference principle represents, in effect, an 
agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as in some respects a common asset 
 
5 TJ p.17 
6 TJ p. 53 
7 TJ p. 86 
8 TJ p. 65 
9 TJ p. 87 
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and to share in the greater social and economic benefits made possible by the 
complementarities of this distribution.’10 That means also, and this is our second point, 
inequalities will exist but these inequalities must be articulated insofar it improves the life 
of the worse-off. For instance, the naturally advantaged can gain more as long as they also 
cover the costs ‘… of training and education and for using their endowments in ways that 
help the less fortunate as well.’ 11 
This leads us to recognize that ‘… in justice as fairness men agree to avail themselves 
of the accidents of nature and social circumstance only when doing so is for the common 
benefit.’12 The difference principle expresses a strong conception of reciprocity: it is a 
principle of mutual benefit.  
Under this light we see how the difference principle allows us to revisit and replace 
the principle of fraternity back on the table of democratic theory. Rawls acknowledges 
that this ideal has taken a secondary place in democratic discourse and practices, mainly 
because it points to ideas or values that are difficult to describe, explain or even justify. 
Fraternity, as it was advanced during the French revolution, has a primary meaning of 
equality, as a radical commitment to a common ground, eliminating modes of servility. It 
also points to ‘a sense of civic friendship’ and ‘social solidarity’. But this ‘civic friendship’ 
sometimes appears as too demanding; and ‘social solidarity’ is easily reduced to a political 
slogan with little content. Rawls wants to rescue this ideal, which, according to him, refers 
us to ‘… the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of 
others who are less well-off.’13 The principle of difference accomplishes this task, it gives 
content to an almost lost ideal, and it directs us to a redefinition of our current political 
and social institutions, having as its concern the distribution of social and economic 
advantages only. 
As such, the articulation of the two principles of justice, in its three-fold manner, 
brings the recognition that there can only be freedom and equality if the ideal of fraternity 
is also guaranteed. The difference principle accomplishes this task, i.e., it tells us that there 
is no way of justifying the moral arbitrariness in distribution of wealth, race or gender. 
The fact that I am born a woman, white, poor or rich, should not determinate which goods 
of society I will have or not have access to. Since citizens are fundamentally equal, it is 
required that institutions guarantee an equal distribution of goods to all, unless an 
unequal distribution proves to be more advantageous to the worst-off. Therefore, the 
concept that underlines Rawls’ articulation between the principles and regulative ideals of 
 
10 TJ p. 87 my italics. 
11 Ibidem. 
12 TJ p. 88 
13 TJ p. 90 
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equality and freedom is the concept of reciprocity: reciprocity in freedom and in equality 
and conceived as fraternity.  
Let us see how the democratic ideals, first advanced by the French Revolution and 
then recovered by Rawls, find their way in the European project.  
 
II. Europe and its Ideals 
The previous section had one specific goal: to show how the revolutionary ideals of 
freedom, equality and fraternity are a necessary condition to defend a democratic project, 
and should be taken as three parts of the same totality. My argument is that if one is 
committed to democracy, one cannot simply embrace the liberal ideal of ‘freedom’ without 
committing oneself to the ideal of ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity’, and this not only in a formal, 
but also in a substantive way. As I tried to show, Rawls has been the philosopher in the 
20th century to bring light to the interdependence of these ideals. 
The goal of this section is to take into account Rawls’ position and relate it to the 
European project. In order to do so, I will start by offering an account of the discourses 
through which Europe commits itself with this set of ideals; second, I will identify the 
progressive abandonment of the fraternity ideal and argue that by doing so Europe may be 
jeopardizing its own future.  
To begin with, we must acknowledge that Rawls’ concern was with democratic 
liberal states. The search for principles of justice is necessary in order to recognize 
objective criteria that allow one to determine what is just and what not in a fair 
cooperation system. Of course, the deliberative process in the original position starts from 
the assumption that there is a common political culture – and here Rawls is thinking of a 
‘democratic culture’ – and the principles are to be applied to a democratic society. As 
Cohen puts it 
Justice as fairness is “for a democratic society”, then, first because it assigns to individuals an 
equal right to participate and thus requires a democratic regime as a matter of basic justice. 
Second, it is addressed to a society of equals, and the content of its principles are shaped by 
that public understanding. Finally, it is intended to guide the political reasoning and 
judgment of the members of a democratic society in their exercise of their political rights.14   
Sharing a common background makes easier to identify principles that can be 
accepted by all and this means that the foundation provided by the two principles of 
 
14 COHEN, J., “For a democratic society” in Freeman, S. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.87. 
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justice allows a wide range of reasonable, even if mutually incompatible comprehensive 
views. Even if TJ is not a theory of democracy, it tells us a lot about democratic thought 
and ultimately the reasoning behind democratic politics. The principles set the boundary 
between what is and what is not reasonable – a boundary that becomes evident once we 
subsume different conceptions of the good under the requirement of reciprocity.  
These principles are key to design a democratic constitution and democratic 
institutions in general; however, they should not be understood in an instrumental 
manner. Justice as fairness is a substantive conception of justice because it is concerned 
not only with the procedures, but also with the outcomes of justice. As Cohen says 
“[J]ustice of process is defined by the rights and liberties included in the first principle; 
justice of outcomes is assessed by reference to the second principle.”15  
Thinking about the relationship between Rawls’ proposal and the European Union is 
challenging. One could argue that there is no way of doing so given the Europe is not a 
‘democratic nation’, therefore, one cannot demand from Europe the kind of response that 
one can demand from one’s national state. Although this certainly is Rawls’ position, there 
is no reason why not to question and try to identify the conditions, which can make 
Europe a fairer system of cooperation, taking Rawlsian principles of justice as guidance.  
Europe is not a nation nor a federation as the US. It is a new political experiment, a 
supra-national constellation, still under construction, that has no definitive political 
contours – even if it has all the political institutions in place, such as the European 
Parliament, European Commission, etc. However, Europe became only possible because it 
shares a common culture. Now, this too could be attacked: after all, Europe is full of 
contrasts and diversities, between different languages, local cultures, political 
backgrounds and so forth. This ‘common’ culture refers not so much to what there ‘is’ in 
Europe – in all its multiplicities – but more to what European nations want to ‘become’. 
Clearly: democracy is the common link. But, which democracy?  
I take democracy in the European union as a commitment to create a new 
community grounded on a set of democratic political regimes but also a great democratic 
society. Since Tocqueville democracy has been associated simultaneously with the political 
and the social dimensions. Unifying both dimensions is the commitment with the ideal of 
equality – democracy is a ‘society of equals’, who by the nature of their equality have the 
same capacity to judge, participate, deliberate, and also to constitute their individual 
subjectivity in an inter-subjective horizon of interdependence, recognition and mutual 
respect. 
 
15 idem p.93 
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 The origins of the European Union were marked by a commitment to the three 
ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity: to harmonize the search for peace, with a 
respect for fundamental individual rights and political equality and to assure a common 
ground for solidarity among States.  
Let us see how the European project is translated in the charter of Fundamental 
Rights (2000). 
The preamble starts by saying that “The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever 
closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common 
values.”16 These common values belong to six blocs: dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, 
citizens’ rights and justice. Let us take a closer look.  
Chapter 1 affirms the intrinsic value of dignity (article 1 to article 5), which 
encompasses the right to life, the right to the integrity of the person, the prohibition of 
torture and degrading treatment and the prohibition of slavery and forced labor. Chapter 
2 defines the freedoms that the EU is committed to protect: right to liberty and security 
(article 6); respect for private and family life (article 7); protection of personal data 
(article 8); right to marry and right to found a family (article 9); freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (article 10); freedom of expression and information (article 11); 
freedom of assembly and of association (article 12); freedom of the arts and sciences 
(article 13); right to education (article 14); freedom to choose an occupation and right to 
engage in work (article 15); freedom to conduct a business (article 16); right to property 
(article 17); right to asylum (article 18) and protection in the event of removal, expulsion 
or extradition (article 19).  
Chapter III defines equality: equality before the law (article 20); non-discrimination 
(article 21); affirmation of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity (Article 22); equality 
of gender (article 23); as well as the recognition of the rights of the child (Article 24); the 
rights of the elderly (article 25) and the integration of persons with disabilities (article 
26).  
Chapter IV defines solidarity. This value is approached from the angle of labor rights 
(workers’ right to information; right of collective bargaining and action; protection against 
unjustified dismissal; fair and just working conditions – article 31); from the angle of 
social security and social assistance; from the angle of health care, access to services and 
consumer protection.17  
 
16 Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000, p.8 
17 In article 34 p.3 it is written “In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union 
recognizes and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence 
 
Re-Thinking Europe. Volume 2 – 2015 
66 
Chapter V is dedicated to expose citizens’ rights (right to vote, right to petition, etc.). 
Chapter VI is devoted to ‘justice’. Justice is clearly treated in its legal and juridical 
dimension: right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (article 47); presumption of 
innocence and right of defense (article 48). 
From this we see that the principle of basic liberties is set forward in chapter 2, the 
principle of equality in chapter 3, in its double angle: formal equality and the demand for 
measures that could be taken as the difference principle: for instance, if we take article 21 
‘non-discrimination’ as conducing to positive measures that compensate for existing 
inequalities which compromise the value of human dignity (chapter 1). Curiously, chapter 
4 on solidarity approaches the fraternity ideal from the labor-angle. Although it is 
understandable given the specific premises, which supported the beginning of the 
European Union – namely, of starting with an economic and monetary project first, rather 
than political – it becomes obvious that in doing so it amputated, or at least suspended, a 
significant part of the European body, necessary for the strengthening of ‘common values’. 
Given that individuals are not only commodities in exchange in the job-market field, but 
moral equal persons, how to turn Europe into a ‘society of equals’?  
Rawls is clear saying that only formal equality of opportunities it not enough to 
make a society just: the community needs to assure a just economic order, and to support 
social capital, by granting equal opportunities of education, culture, equal opportunities in 
economic activities, avoiding monopolies and granting a social minimum. Again, one could 
argue that Rawls’ proposal is targeted to nation-states, and not to the European supra-
national experiment, therefore, these opportunities should be granted by European 
nations, individually considered. However, our point is simply to show that a) if Europe 
represents a social contract between different States, b) if it is committed to democratic 
ideals, c) if democracy has as its pillars liberty, equality and fraternity; d) if equality is 
granted through the equal right of free movement; then, e) Europe must rethink the 
content of the three foundational concepts as well as their relationship – therefore, it is 
necessary to bring fraternity back. The three ideals go hand in hand. But what would 
fraternity mean in today’s context?  
To start with, the idea of fraternity points to two different directions: it points 
inwards to those who share a common way of life (within each nation or region) and it 
points outwards to those who adopt different ways of life (different regions, nations, 
world). Fraternity appears as a matter of fact – among individuals within nations or 
between nations – but also as a normative standard according to which one can apply the 
difference principle, i.e., one can arrive at just outcomes in the distribution. Fraternity 
 
for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community 
law and national laws and practices.”  
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imposes the particular attitude vis-à-vis the individual(s), and assumes the universal 
horizon of commonality. Why is it important to rescue fraternity in the European context?  
Europe is living a crisis of legitimacy: the European union can no longer sustain a 
practical commitment with the principles it endorses. While Europe had its existence 
justified after World War II, today the legitimacy of its rule is being contested on several 
grounds. I will not enter into details here – I would probably need to start by providing an 
account of the ‘crisis’ of liberal democracy or democracy tout court.  For our purpose I 
want to mention two challenges, which seem to compromise the European project as a 
whole and the stability of coexistence between European nations. First, Europe is 
observing the rise of nationalist and populist movements that spread discord and conflict 
across the continent. Second, this new political dynamics exacerbates Europe’s abyss 
between North and South, on the one hand; and it also brings to light the problem of 
sovereignty of democratic states.  
Regarding the first challenge, one observes several shifts in political discourses 
across Europe, which simultaneously brings to evidence the large political vacuum in 
Europe (or the truly ‘political’ problem of Europe) and the conflict between alternative 
modes of thinking and doing politics. From Finland to France, extreme-right parties 
capture a great percentage of populations’ support. Throughout Europe one sees 
discourses that foster ‘solidarity’ and ‘fraternity’ among themselves, excluding the ‘other’ – 
regardless if the ‘other’ is an equal European citizen or and outsider/ immigrant.  
On the other side of the spectrum, we have countries like Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, 
where we observe the increasing visibility of new political voices – Greece, for instance, 
has a new prime-minister Alexis Tsipras, from Syriza Party, which is a radical left-wing 
oriented party. The fact that he won the last elections was initially seen as a victory for 
politics insofar it created a rupture in the European mainstream political spectrum, where 
everything tended to converge to the center. Tsipras represented the hope that it is/was 
possible to do politics differently; it also forced Europe to rethink the legitimacy of its 
decisions under the light of justice.18 Another example of rupture in Europe is Podemos in 
Spain. Both movements represent(ed) the hope for reinvention of political dialogue in 
Europe. It is interesting to observe the rise of opposite movements: extreme-right and the 
revival of the Left. The first thing to do is to try to understand why this is happening. 
People are not ‘irrational’ in supporting right or left; people have wants, needs, 
frustrations, and these parties are able to capitalize on that and create a discourse that 
reflects their aspirations and resolves their anxieties. This rise shows that the 
parties/movements involved are capable to fill out the political void that exists in Europe. 
 
18 This hope was recently challenged, given that Tsipras, despite his effort to transform political 
negotiations in Europe, was forced to accept more austerity measures.  
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They provide a social guidance, a social orientation that Europe as a whole has dismissed. 
In other words, these parties, or movements, right to left, give content and meaning to the 
concept of fraternity and they bring out to the table the need to address social injustices 
(unemployment, exclusion, discrimination, lack of opportunities, etc.). 
Second, related to this legitimacy crisis that creates the propitious environment for 
the revival of old discourses (anti-European) or the creation of new ones, one needs to 
address the impact of the gap between economic, social and political measures, since this 
gap compromises any pretension to arrive at a just society, or even more radically put, a 
large ‘society of equals’. Austerity packages that were imposed across different nations 
(Greece, Portugal, Ireland) had serious consequences for these countries and Europe as a 
whole. On the one hand, it exacerbated the abyss between North and South but also 
between Europe as a whole and each nation in particular. In doing so it also put into 
question the sovereignty of the state and the democratic regime and culture of each 
nation. By being forced to accept Troika’s impositions, each country was deprived of its 
foundation: its sovereignty was stripped out and the relationship between representatives 
and represented became meaningless. I will not go into details, for the debate is well 
known. The point I want to make is that by contesting the democratic ground of each 
nation, by promoting technocracy over politics, Europe was seen on a different light, and 
the question emerged: is the European project doomed to failure? After all, what reasons 
do citizens have to comply with the rules (and by ‘rules’ I also mean ‘democratic rules’) if 
reciprocity seems to converge with exploitation and domination instead of justice?   
 
III. European Challenges  
Europe can only become a fair system of cooperation if a) rescues a set of ideals – 
democratic ideals of equality, liberty and fraternity; b) creates measures to apply these 
ideals in the system of practices; c) creates a new discourse and narrative. In this section I 
will go back to Rawls and try to explain why I consider these three elements as necessary 
condition for Europe’s survival. In order to do so, I will look at two other challenges 
Europe is facing today: the problem of unemployment (at domestic level but also at the 
‘union’ level since it impacts dynamics of migration within the common space); second, the 
problem brought by ‘European citizenship’.  
In the description of the original position, Rawls takes rational individuals, equals as 
moral persons, as the starting-point. These individuals are committed to reciprocity 
insofar it is assumed that individuals recognize each other as equals. Without this 
supposition reciprocal exchange would be impossible. Therefore, it is clear that rationality 
in Rawls assumes a horizon of reciprocity to start with, in order to find the principles that 
can guarantee a mutually advantageous cooperation. Reciprocity affirms itself in a positive 
way – fostering social cohesion and justice as fairness – but also negatively, insofar it can 
Re-Thinking Europe. Volume 1 – 2011 
69 
impose asymmetrical demands upon the relationship between individuals, mediated by 
institutions. 
The difference principle, as we have seen, is a principle of reciprocity; it incarnates 
the revolutionary ideal of fraternity, which involves an improvement of the worse-off with 
respect to the initial ‘arrangement of equality’. The strongest argument for reciprocity, 
however, is the argument of stability. The entire point of making this movement of 
suspending one’s identity and identifying the principles of justice is to assure that one will 
comply to the rules, it will obey authority, it will have a standard that will allow one to 
distinguish the just from the unjust. Once the basic structure of society is set according to 
these principles it will embody the ideal of equality from its inception (as ‘equal moral 
persons’) and have a set of strategies that will allow institutions to deal with natural and 
social inequalities. This, of course, will impact the ways in which rights and duties are 
assigned to each, through institutions. Reciprocity is the invisible hand that is always 
working but which to some extent cannot be pinpointed. 
As we have seen Europe does not fit into the closed society of a domestic state 
required for the TJ, therefore the question is not how to make Rawls’ conception of justice 
work in European context. However, it originally stands for a system of cooperation 
between nations. All nations share democratic assumptions, despite the fact that each 
country has its specific constitution. But this cooperation translates itself in a limited 
concept of freedom (to exchange, to buy, to move), and a thin concept of equality 
(dependent on freedom’s definition). Consequently, this system of cooperation is only 
partial: it does not aim, in practice, at creating a common, integrative, inclusive, reciprocal 
community; it is hostage of its hybrid condition of not wanting to become a federation, nor 
wanting to be reduced to a set of nations. A ‘society of equals’ in such context is simply 
impossible. So, actually the question should be: How to transform actual Europe in a 
system of fair cooperation? 
If one looks at the situation of unemployment today, one can easily identify how far 
Europe still is from an egalitarian and just society. 
According to Eurostat, in February 2015 Europe has approximately 24 million 
people unemployed, however the distribution of unemployment is unequal across the 28 
countries: Germany had the lowest unemployment rates (4,8%), followed by Austria 
(5,3%), while Greece had the highest rates (26%) as well as Spain (23,2%).19 If one looks 
at youth unemployment trends, the number increases significantly, reaching 24%, 
distributed in the following way: Greece, with 58,3%, Spain with 55,5%, Croatia with 
49,7%, Italy with 40%, Cyprus with 38,9%, Portugal with 37,7%. Germany and Austria 
 
19 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics. Access 
on April 28th 2015 
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were the only member states with a youth unemployment rate below 10% (7,9% and 
9,2% respectively).  
If one analyses these numbers in the light of income distribution in Europe, it 
becomes clearer that Europe is far from being a just society. According to the European 
commission 
“In the EU in 2011, the income share of the richest 10% of the population was largest in 
Portugal and Latvia (where the top 10% had 27% of total income), while in Cyprus, the UK, 
Bulgaria and France the top 10% had 25-26% of income.”  
And  
“In the EU, the value of the Gini coefficient in 2011 ranged from 0.24 (in Slovenia) to 0.35 (in 
Latvia). Other countries at the top of the ranking were Portugal (0.34) together with another 
four countries, where the value of the Gini coefficient was around 0.33, Romania, Greece, 
Bulgaria, and Spain. At the bottom of the country ranking, Sweden, Czech Republic, and the 
Netherlands have Ginis that are only slightly higher than Slovenia's (around 0.25). Other 
countries can be broadly divided into two groups, with France, the UK and Ireland, some of 
the Southern European countries and the EU13 countries having Ginis of between 0.30 and 
0.33, and other EU15 countries together with Malta, Slovakia and Hungary having values of 
between 0.25 and 0.29.” 20 
 
Portugal and Latvia are the countries with highest inequality in income distribution. 
Of course this is only part of the picture: to this one must look at the wealth: who has it 
and how society distributes it.  
Rawls argued that a fair society must rely on an appropriate scheme of institutions, 
where social and economic processes are thought through political and legal institutions. 
In many occasions Rawls argues that a society is just if and when can counterbalance the 
tendency of too much accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few, while assuring a 
social minimum for all citizens.21 The point of Rawls is to show that a society is only fair 
when it is capable of addressing and correcting the distribution of wealth and ‘to prevent 
concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality 
of opportunity.’22  
 
20 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1050&intPageId=1870&langId=en. Access on April 
28th 2015. 
21 Rawls says ‘... the government guarantees a social minimum either by Family allowances and 
special payments for sickness and employment, or more systematically by such devices as a graded 
income supplement (a so-called negative income tax).’ TJ, p.243  
22 TJ, p.245 
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However, Europe faces another challenge, which is a structural problem from 
within: individuals who belong to member-States define their ‘European citizenship’ via 
the freedom of movement, i.e., the freedom to move and live in any European country. The 
opening of frontiers brought new rights to individuals (the right of circulation), and it 
created a common ground that eradicated ‘immigration’ policies, for instance. Kochenov 
tells us that  
By granting EU citizens free movement rights, the Treaties de facto and also de jure made it 
largely impossible for the Member States to have any ‘immigration’ policy concerning EU 
citizens. In other words, modern EU states cannot give preference to their own nationals 
compared with other EU citizens and are not entitled to stand in the way of EU citizens 
exercising their Treaty rights.’23   
What this means is that officially no European citizen is immigrant in any EU nation. 
However, once we try to flesh out the content of ‘European citizenship’ we face theoretical 
and practical obstacles. Theoretical, because there is no European constitution that 
actually defines the rights and duties of citizens. Practical, because individuals still define 
themselves mainly through the angle of ‘national citizenship’; and the rights ‘European 
citizenship’ grants can only be accomplished at the expense of concrete democratic rights 
(political rights in particular). Do European citizens have the same political rights 
regardless of the country they live in? Not really. For instance, citizens who reside in a 
country different from their nationality cannot vote for national elections. This simply 
does not seem fair: 
Should being European in Europe not entitle you to have a say in the way the part of Europe 
you live, work, and pay taxes is governed? … Should their lack of a possibility to use the 
democratic process in order to influence policies by which they will be directly affected not 
be construed as a potential obstruction to mobility? Who wants to go and live in a country 
without being able to exercise full democratic rights?’24  
Taking this into account one sees that while formally the existence of many ‘peoples’ 
and nations in Europe does not – and cannot entail – any kind of immigration or 
discrimination policies, and despite the fact that every European citizen is ‘equal’ to every 
other, formally speaking, one could argue that there is another type of discrimination 
taking place: most individuals, given the pressure of the labor market, in order to escape 
the trap of unemployment, willingly make the trade-off for jobs in exchange of political, 
social and even cultural autonomy.25 What a closer observation of migration dynamics in 
Europe tells us is that there is only a ‘formal European citizenship’, but which has no 
 
23 KOCHENOV, D., “What’s in a people? Social facts, individual choice and the European Union” in 
Jeffers, Kristen (Ed.) Inclusive Democracy in Europe, European University Institute, 2012, p. 84 
24 CAYLA, Ph. and SETH, C., “Kick-Off contribution” in: JEFFERS, K. (Ed.) Inclusive Democracy in 
Europe, European University Institute, 2012, p. 67 
25 COSTA, M. N., “Europe, what future?” in Res Publica, vol. 18, n.1, 2015, p. 161. 
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substantive content. As I argued elsewhere, as long ‘as Europe remains hostage of 
neoliberal ‘politics’ […] Europe is doomed to fail, because neoliberalism is incompatible 
with democracy and with Politics.’26  
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
To conclude I must say that Europe has to reinvent itself if it wants to survive. An 
economic union – with its discourse of freedom and equality reduced to the labor-market 
– is clearly not sufficient; in fact, it appears to be a growing motive for discontentment and 
disenchantment with European politics. It is important to go back to Rawls for two 
reasons: First, Europe was the product of a commitment with democratic ideals. In order 
to survive, Europe must change and reinvent its discourse and produce a new narrative, 
reinforcing its historical commitment with freedom, equality and fraternity. Rawls shows 
that these three dimensions are interdependent. It remains the challenge of transforming 
this narrative in a new set of practices. This leads us to our second reason. Rawls shows 
the importance and even symbolic significance of creating a Constitution according to 
principles of justice. Only a European constitution can foster the necessary sense of 
belonging of individuals and nations to this common project. As Rawls says ‘the 
constitution establishes a secure common status of equal citizenship and realizes political 
justice’27  and ‘… the basic structure is regulated by a just constitution that secures the 
liberties of equal citizenship.’28 Only then can a true ‘solidarity among states’ begin to 
flourish.  
Given the pluralism and diversity in European space, the difference principle is a key 
element in fostering a common sense of belonging to something, which is still new – and a 
sense of reciprocity between individuals from different states. The difference principle 
creates a solid ground for fraternity’s return in political discourse and institutional 
design.29 Europe must be courageous enough to give this step and dare to re-conceptualize 
its institutions according to the difference principle – the principle that embodies 
 
26 Idem, p.163 
27 TJ, p.175 
28 Idem, p. 243 
29 For instance, confronting the challenge of unemployment today, and in trying to arrive at a 
criterion that allows to determinate the ‘social minimum’ in Europe, one could take Rawls 
statement as guide: ‘Once the difference principle is accepted … it follows that the minimum is to be 
set at that point which, taking wages into account, maximizes the expectations of the least 
advantaged group. By adjusting the amount of transfers … it is possible to increase or decrease the 
prospects of the more disadvantaged, their index of primary goods … so as to achieve the desired 
result.’ (TJ, p. 252) A social minimum does not imply scaling down from the greater wealth until 
everyone has nearly the same income. It simply implies that adjustments are made as to improve 
‘the long-term prospects of the least favored extending over future generations.’ (idem)  
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practices of solidarity and which is capable of establishing a system of cooperation that is 
mutually advantaged and capable of dealing with several forms of domination. Only then 
‘European citizens’ will be able to conquer a truly significant ontological and political 
status. 
 
 
